The Effect of Public Policy on Health Service Providers by Allison, Marier
Syracuse University 
SURFACE 
Economics - Dissertations Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs 
5-2013 
The Effect of Public Policy on Health Service Providers 
Marier Allison 
Syracuse University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://surface.syr.edu/ecn_etd 
 Part of the Economics Commons, and the Public Policy Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Allison, Marier, "The Effect of Public Policy on Health Service Providers" (2013). Economics - 
Dissertations. 99. 
https://surface.syr.edu/ecn_etd/99 
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs 
at SURFACE. It has been accepted for inclusion in Economics - Dissertations by an authorized administrator of 
SURFACE. For more information, please contact surface@syr.edu. 
Abstract 
 
Chapter 1 
 
Low-income, publicly insured admissions historically cost more to treat than the average patient. 
To ensure that hospitals are reimbursed an adequate amount for care of indigent populations, 
Medicare reimburses hospitals an additional percentage amount according to federally set 
financial schedule. The reimbursement cutoff is discrete: at fifteen percent of a disproportionate 
patient percentage, a hospital is reimbursed an extra 2.5 percent of the standard prospective 
payment rate. I extend a simple model of hospital quality as a function of insurance 
reimbursement increases to determine that under certain circumstances there exists a positive 
relationship between quality and reimbursement. I use Hospital Consumer Assessment of 
Healthcare Providers and Systems data to analyze hospital ratings around the fifteen percent 
disproportionate patient percentage cutoff and find that on average, hospital ratings increase by 
six percentage points. When a subsample of non-profit hospitals is analyzed, hospital ratings 
increase by an average of 6.5 percentage points, primarily driven by patient facility cleanliness 
and medical provider communication ratings.   
 
Chapter 2 
 
The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) created the Hospital Compare Program 
in 2003 to increase transparency between health care providers and consumers. Implemented in 
2005, this transparency consists of hospitals’ collecting and making publicly available a set of 
hospital quality score measures. The CMS induced participation by financially penalizing 
hospitals that did not publicly report a specific subset of these measures (called "starter" 
measures). Three years into the program, the penalty for non-reporting both the starter measures 
and other ("non-starter") measures was increased. I use a difference-in-differences methodology 
to analyze the effect of the increased CMS penalty on the likelihood that a hospital publicly 
reported its starter and non-starter measure scores. I find that the penalty had an economically 
and statistically insignificant effect on the probability that a hospital publicly reported its starter 
scores but a statistically significant eight percent effect (p < 0.01) on whether it reported its non-
starter scores. These findings are robust to a series of alternative empirical specifications. 
 
Chapter 3 
 
In 2006, Massachusetts passed a health care reform which required individuals to purchase 
health insurance and provided subsidized health insurance to the poor.  The reform greatly 
increased the proportion of the state population that was insured.  In this study we use a large 
data set of private health insurance claims to analyze the effect of the increase in the number of 
insured on physician reimbursement. We find that reimbursement for well-infant visits rose by 
approximately 4 percent during the reform implementation period, but the increase did not 
persist.  Reimbursement for well-adult visits and appendectomies remained unchanged. Triple 
difference estimates using appendectomies (for which demand is extremely inelastic) as an 
additional control group show a 2 percent rise in well-infant visit reimbursement during the 
implementation period and no effect afterwards or on well-adult visit reimbursement.  Estimates 
imply a temporary increase in the cost of health services with relatively elastic demand following 
a large scale insurance mandate, such as the Affordable Care Act. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
The Effect of Public Policy on Health Service Providers 
 
 
 
 
by 
 
Allison Marier 
 
 
B.S., Colorado School of Mines, 2006 
M.A., Syracuse University, 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
                                             Dissertation     
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                        Syracuse University     
    May 2013 
                             
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © Allison Marier 2013 
All Rights Reserved 
	v	
	
Table	of	Contents	
Chapter	1:	Where	Does	the	Money	Go?	Analyzing	the	Patient	Experience	in	Safety	Net	Hospitals	.....	1 
Introduction	..........................................................................................................................................................................	2 
Disproportionate	Share	Hospitals	...............................................................................................................................	6 
Theoretical	Model	.............................................................................................................................................................	10 
Data	.........................................................................................................................................................................................	12 
Demographic	Variables	.............................................................................................................................................	13 
Estimation	............................................................................................................................................................................	14 
Results	...................................................................................................................................................................................	19 
All	Owners	versus	Non‐Profit	.................................................................................................................................	19 
Quantile	Regression	Results	....................................................................................................................................	20 
Robustness	..........................................................................................................................................................................	21 
Hospital	Manipulation	and	Robustness	to	Bandwidth	Selection	.............................................................	21 
Cross	Section	versus	Fixed	Effects	........................................................................................................................	22 
Cost	Effectiveness	.............................................................................................................................................................	23 
Policy	Implications	...........................................................................................................................................................	24 
Implications	for	the	Affordable	Care	Act	................................................................................................................	25 
Conclusion	...........................................................................................................................................................................	26 
References	...........................................................................................................................................................................	26 
Chapter	2:		Do	Hospitals	React	to	Penalties?	The	Impact	of	Financial	Penalties	on	Hospital	Score	
Reporting	Behavior	...............................................................................................................................................................	41 
Introduction	........................................................................................................................................................................	42 
Hospital	Compare	and	Medicare	Reimbursement	..............................................................................................	45 
Theoretical	...........................................................................................................................................................................	48 
Data	.........................................................................................................................................................................................	49 
Estimation	............................................................................................................................................................................	53 
Results	...................................................................................................................................................................................	56 
Robustness	..........................................................................................................................................................................	58 
Discussion	............................................................................................................................................................................	61 
Conclusion	...........................................................................................................................................................................	62 
References	...........................................................................................................................................................................	63 
Appendix	2.1	.......................................................................................................................................................................	76 
	vi	
	
Chapter	3:		The	Effect	of	Mandated	Health	Insurance	on	Physician	Reimbursement:	Evidence	from	
the	Massachusetts	Health	Reform	..................................................................................................................................	81 
Introduction	........................................................................................................................................................................	82 
The	Massachusetts	Health	Insurance	Reform	......................................................................................................	85 
Theoretical	Considerations	..........................................................................................................................................	86 
Data	.........................................................................................................................................................................................	89 
Price	Data	........................................................................................................................................................................	89 
Demographic		Information	.......................................................................................................................................	91 
Methods	................................................................................................................................................................................	92 
Results	...................................................................................................................................................................................	93 
Appendectomy	..............................................................................................................................................................	93 
Well‐Infant	Visits	.........................................................................................................................................................	94 
Well‐Adult	Visits	...........................................................................................................................................................	94 
Threats	to	Identification	................................................................................................................................................	95 
Refinement	–	Triple	Differences	.................................................................................................................................	97 
Conclusion	...........................................................................................................................................................................	98 
References	...........................................................................................................................................................................	99 
Appendix	3.1:	Minimum	Credible	Coverage	Requirements	.........................................................................	111 
Appendix	3.2:	Prices	in	Massachusetts	and	Northeastern	States	................................................................	viii 
	
Table	of	Illustrative	Material	
Table	1.1:	Reimbursement	Rules	for	Disproportionate	Share	Hospitals	.............................................	34 
Table	1.2:	Control	Variables,	Above	and	Below	the	15%	DPP	Cutoff	.....................................................	35 
Table	1.3:	Consumer	Assessment	Questions	and	Hospital	Rating	Answers	.......................................	36 
Table	1.4:	Overall	Satisfaction	Regression	........................................................................................................	37 
Table	1.5:	Categorical	Results	for	Full	Sample	(With	Covariates)	..........................................................	viii 
Table	1.6:	Categorical	Results	for	Non‐Profit	Subsample	(With	Covariates)	.....................................	39 
Table	1.7:	Quantile	Regression	Results,	Medicare	Percentage	and	DSH	Status	.................................	40 
Figure	1.1:	McCrary	Plot	for	Manipulation	of	DPP	.........................................................................................	41 
Figure	1.2:	Robustness	of	Bandwidth	Choice,	All	Hospitals	.......................................................................	42 
Figure	1.3:	Robustness	of	Bandwidth	Choice,	Non‐Profit	Hospitals	......................................................	43 
Table	1.8:	Placebo	Discontinuity	Regressions	.................................................................................................	44 
	vii	
	
Table	2.1:	Hospital	Compare	Quality	Measures	..............................................................................................	69 
Table	2.2:	Summary	Statistics	for	Acute	Care	Hospitals	and	Critical	Access	Hospitals	..................	70 
Table	2.3:	Critical	Access	Hospital	Mandated	Characteristics	..................................................................	71 
Figure	2.1:	Starter	Measure	Reporting	Rates	...................................................................................................	72 
Figure	2.2:	Mean	Reporting	Rates	for	Starter	and	Non‐Starter	Measures,	Acute	Care	Hospitals
	.............................................................................................................................................................................................	73 
Table	2.4:	Difference‐in‐Differences	Estimates	of	the	Reimbursement	Penalty	Change	on	
Starter	Measures	..........................................................................................................................................................	74 
Table	2.5:	Difference‐in‐Differences	Estimates	of	the	Effect	of	Non‐Starter	Penalty	Enactment	
Using	Acute	Care	Starter	Measures	as	Control	Group	..................................................................................	75 
Table	2.6:	Starter	Measure	Pre‐Trend	Robustness	Checks	........................................................................	76 
Table	2.7:	Non‐Starter	Pre‐Trend	Robustness	Checks	.................................................................................	77 
Table	2.8:	Calculating	the	marginal	effects	of	penalty	increases,	Acute	Care	Hospitals	.................	78 
Table	2.9:	Calculating	the	marginal	effects	of	penalty	increases,	Acute	Care	and	Critical	Access	
Hospitals	..........................................................................................................................................................................	79 
Figure	3.1:	Market	Demand	for	Health	Care	..................................................................................................	106 
Table	3.1:	CPT	codes	................................................................................................................................................	107 
Table	3.2:	Demographic	Summary	Statistics	.................................................................................................	108 
Table	3.3A:	Reform	Effects	on	Appendectomy	Prices	...............................................................................	109 
Table	3.3B:	Reform	Effects	on	Well‐Infant	Visit	Prices	.............................................................................	110 
Table	3.3C:	Reform	Effects	on	Well‐Adult	Visit	Prices	..............................................................................	111 
Table	3.4:	Physician	Supply	in	Massachusetts,	Yearly	and	DD	Estimates	.........................................	112 
Table	3.5A:	Reform	Effects	on	Well‐Infant	Visit	Prices	(Triple	Difference)	.....................................	113 
Table	3.5B:	Reform	Effects	on	Well‐Adult	Visit	Prices	(Triple	Difference)	......................................	114 
Figure	3.2:	Price	Trends	in	Health	Services	...................................................................................................	116 
	
	
	
	
	
	
	 	
1  
Chapter 1: Where Does the Money Go? Analyzing the 
Patient Experience in Safety Net Hospitals 
                       
2  
Introduction 
 
For the same illness, low-income patients are more costly to treat than those who are not 
indigent. To compensate hospitals for the difference in the cost of care between patients, 
Medicare reimburses hospitals with greater than 15 percent low-income patient admissions an 
additional percentage of the prospective payment rate. I analyze patient-reported hospital ratings 
to determine whether funds that should be allocated toward patient care are being used for this 
purpose. 
Twenty-six percent of a hospital’s admissions are, on average, low-income patients. This 
percentage is called a hospital’s “disproportionate share,” and a hospital’s Medicare 
reimbursement rate directly depends on this percentage. Hospitals that qualify for the 
disproportionate share reimbursement can expect, on average, to receive an additional 2-3 
million dollars yearly from Medicare.  Federal Medicare disproportionate share spending reached 
9.1 billion dollars in 20091: more than 75 percent of acute-care hospitals in the United States 
qualified for these funds. Of debate in the economics literature is whether the money is used for 
patient care: most disproportionate share research examines the impact of additional 
reimbursement on hospital mortality rates. Using patient satisfaction scores instead of mortality 
rates, I am able to determine whether patients treated at hospitals that qualify for Medicare 
disproportionate share payments (DSH) receive different care than those who do not.   
Hospital quality and effective use of funds are typically measured using patient outcome 
data. Until recently, this measure has been the best available data for hospital quality research, 
despite the fact that patients who are severely ill may choose different hospitals than the less ill 
(Cutler et al., 2004). Using patient mortality and hospital financial data, Duggan (2000) finds that 
1 http://www.naph.org/Archived-Advocacy/Industry-DSH-letter.aspx?FT=.pdf                                                              
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not-for-profit and for-profit hospitals in California that qualified for Medicaid disproportionate 
share payments saw no drop in infant mortality rates, but instead increased their financial 
holdings dollar for dollar. Baicker and Staiger (2006) find that public hospitals that receive 
Medicaid DSH funds see a slight decrease in infant and heart attack mortality rates. Lindrooth et 
al. (2006) uses staffing decisions instead of patient outcomes in a study of the effects of the 
Balanced Budget Act on safety-net hospitals2. When hospital revenues were adversely affected 
by a change in reimbursement rates, non-safety-net (non-DSH) hospitals reduce nursed staffing 
by approximately 6 percent and no significant effect was found for DSH hospitals.  My study 
differs from previous work in two fundamental ways: hospital patient experience data are used 
instead of hospital mortality ratings or staffing ratios and only the Medicare DSH program is 
evaluated instead of jointly with a state’s Medicaid DSH program.  
The data used in my study are not new to the medical and health services literature. 
Countless health services research articles use data from the recent United States Center for 
Medicaid and Medicare Services (CMS) Physician, Nursing Home, and Hospital Compare 
programs. Lehrman et al. (2009) provides qualitative analysis that describes the correlations 
between hospital characteristics and hospital performance on clinical process scores and patient 
experience measures. They find that small and large hospitals (fewer than 100 beds or greater 
than 200 beds), non-profit hospitals, and northeastern and mid-western hospitals perform in the 
top quartile of both patient experience and clinical process measures. The closest research to this 
study, Werner et al. (2008) use the first three years of the Hospital Compare clinical process data 
to determine how disproportionate share hospital payment affect hospital performance on clinical 
process quality measures. The authors separate hospitals with high and low (40% and 5%, 
2 A safety net hospital is one that treats a large volume of Medicaid or Medicare/SSI patients and in most cases is eligible to receive both Medicare and Medicaid disproportionate share funds.                                                               
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respectively) Medicaid patient percentages, and simulate the effect of a change in reimbursement 
on the hospital process quality measures. They find that from 2004 to 2006, safety-net hospitals 
show a smaller performance increase than non-safety-net hospitals. In the health economics 
literature,  Werner et al. (2012), implements a difference in differences strategy using the 
Nursing Home Compare Program data to find that there is a small, causal, and positive 
relationship between nursing home “report cards” and the market share of nursing homes. Dafny 
and Dranove (2008) use Medicare enrollee HMO plan assessments to determine the effect of 
health management organization (HMO) patient experience scores and Healthcare Effectiveness 
Data and Information Set (HEDIS) on future changes of plan enrollees.  
The first part of the analysis uses hospital ratings from the Consumer Assessment of 
Healthcare Providers and Systems (CAHPS). These patient-provided data rate aspects of the 
hospital experience. I restrict the analysis to all and non-profit hospitals just above and below the 
fifteen percent disproportionate patient percentage (DPP) cutoff, and then regress hospital ratings 
on DSH status. I include hospital-level fixed effects to control for unobserved time-invariant 
hospital heterogeneity. The effect of DSH hospital status is identified by hospitals switching over 
the fifteen percent boundary. 
A hospital’s level of Medicare DSH reimbursement increases with the number of 
Medicare patients treated. In my secondary analysis, I perform quantile regression analysis to 
determine the effect on hospital quality of Medicare admissions in hospitals that qualify for DSH 
reimbursement. Quantile regression allows for the identification of the effect of increased levels 
of DSH reimbursement on a hospital’s quality score at given points in the quality distribution. I 
expect that high performing hospitals to be less affected by increased levels of DSH 
reimbursement as a result of high Medicare patient populations, whereas low-performing 
5  
hospitals will be positively affected by increased levels of DSH reimbursement. I conduct the 
quantile analysis for the full sample of hospitals, and then for the subsample of non-profit 
hospitals.  
I find that the impact of the DSH reimbursement increases hospital ratings by eight 
percent (six percentage points) for all owners, and modestly increases to a ten percent (6.5 
percentage points) for non-profits hospitals. DSH status for non-profit hospitals increases ratings 
in all individual categories, but the effects are significant (approximately a ten percentage point 
increase) in the hospital cleanliness and medical staff communication categories.  This finding is 
in line with a recent opinion article published by Drs. Herbert Pardes and Edward Miller who 
argue against a proposed cut in Medicare graduate medical education expenditures.3 The article 
states that a cut in graduate medical education funding would affect all services offered by 
hospitals; it is reasonable to expect that Medicare funding cuts through the DSH reimbursement 
would similarly affect all hospital services.  
The quantile regression esimation yields interesting results. On average, DSH hospital 
status increases hospital ratings by six percent, but a ten percent increase in a hospital’s Medicare 
admissions increases the median quality score by approximately one percentage point. The effect 
of Medicare patient admissions, a statistically significant increase of approximately one 
percentage point, is largest for hospitals in the 25th and 50th percentiles of the score distribution 
but is small and statistically insignificant for hospitals in the 75th percentile of the quality 
distribution. These results are indicative that additional reimbursement may make a large 
difference for hospitals that struggle to meet pay-for-performance benchmarks. 
3 Pardes, Herbert, and Edward D. Miller. "We Can’t Afford to Train Fewer Doctors; the Savings from Government 
Funding Cuts to Graduate Medical Education Aren’t Worth the Negative Effect on Patients." Wall Street 
Journal (Online) (2011).  
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Disproportionate Share Hospitals 
The disproportionate share reimbursement was established in 1985 through the 
Consolidated Omnibus Reconciliation Act (COBRA). COBRA actualized a switch from cost-
based reimbursement to a prospective payment scheme. Lawmakers knew during the creation of 
the act that indigent patients cost more to treat than those who are not. To compensate hospitals 
for treating low-income patients, Congress created an upward adjustment to traditional Medicare 
reimbursement for hospitals that treat a higher share of the needy.4 Without additional financial 
incentive, the shift from a cost-based reimbursement scheme (pre-1986) would not necessarily 
ensure that those who most need intensive care would receive it.5  
The additional reimbursement is federally funded through the Medicare program. 
Hospitals submit cost reports to both the federal and state governments at the end of each fiscal 
year and then are appropriately reimbursed for their "disproportionate patient percentage." The 
Medicare Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) payment adjustments are provider-specific, not 
patient-specific. Medicare reimbursement and the DSH adjustment are separate programs but can 
function together. For example, if a patient covered by Medicare enters a hospital that qualifies 
for a DSH adjustment, then whatever Medicare payments are owed to the hospital for the cost of 
the patient’s care are multiplied by a DSH adjustment. If the same patient sees a doctor in a 
private office setting, then the doctor does not receive a DSH adjustment. Medicare reimburses 
hospitals an additional percentage of the prospective payment rate for treating large percentages 
(15 percent and over) of indigent patients. This percentage is attached to all Medicare patients 
treated at the hospital, not only those who are considered indigent.  
Federal minimum qualifications determine whether a hospital is considered a DSH 
hospital. The federal requirements for hospital DSH reimbursement are based on the hospital 
4 COBRA act of 1986 5 CMS website, disproportionate share hospital definition                                                               
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type, number of beds in the hospital, and the disproportionate patient percentage that the hospital 
treats. The current minimum qualifications for DSH status are detailed in Table 1. Most 
important for qualification as a DSH hospital is the number of low-income patients admitted into 
a hospital: additional reimbursement is a function of this number. Most hospital types face 
reimbursement caps of 12 percent additional reimbursement. Currently, the minimum 
“disproportionate patient percentage“(DPP) necessary for qualification as a DSH is fifteen 
percent6, while historically, the minimum percentage has been as high as twenty-five percent.7 
The calculation of the disproportionate share percentage is as follows: 
𝐷𝑃𝑃 = 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑆𝑆𝐼 𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑠 + 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑖𝑑,𝑁𝑜𝑛−𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑠𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑠       (1) 
Equation 1 adds the hospital percentage of dually eligible Medicare and supplemental security 
income patient-days to the hospital percentage of Medicaid (and non-Medicare) patient-days. 
Mathematically, the DSH adjustment for hospitals with a specific DPP can be expressed as:  
𝐷𝑆𝐻 𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 = � 0                                                                    𝑖𝑓 𝐷𝑃𝑃 < 0.150.025 + [. 65 ∗ (DPP −  .15)]       𝑖𝑓 0.15 ≤ 𝐷𝑃𝑃 ≤ 0.2020.0588 +  [. 825 ∗ (DPP −  .202)]         𝑖𝑓 0.202 < 𝐷𝑃𝑃   (2) 
The discontinuity in hospital DSH status adjustment provides an exceptional opportunity to study 
hospital quality as a function of a change in service price: while hospitals qualify for DSH status 
when 15 percent of admissions are low-income and publicly insured, there should be no 
significant difference between observables other than quality in hospitals just above and below 
6 42 CFR 412.106 7 Social Security Act                                                              
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the cutoff. 8  
Differences by Ownership  
A non-profit hospital is fundamentally different than a proprietary hospital in that any net 
profits cannot be redistributed to the owners of a non-profit hospital. A public hospital is owned 
and operated by the state or Federal government: any net profit belongs to the public.  
The hospital ownership literature presents three reasons for why the quality of hospital 
services may differ due to ownership:  
1) A soft budget constraint: This exists when firms can operate and provide services at a 
cost greater than their revenue. Public hospitals are operated by the government: funds 
may be (and empirically are) transferred both in and out of the hospital’s budget to 
subsidize other public activities. Numerous studies, most notably Duggan (2000) and 
Baicker and Staiger (2005) find that government ownership and an increased budget 
constraint, which intuitively and fundamentally should provide a higher quality of service 
to those most in need, does not guarantee that a change in treatment is offered. 
Examining revenue changes before and after the California Medicaid DSH program went 
into effect, Duggan (2000) finds that every Medicaid DSH dollar received by public 
hospitals was reclaimed by the state. As a result, Duggan (2000) finds no effect of 
Medicaid DSH hospital status on infant mortality rates (his measure of quality). Baicker 
and Staiger (2005) report similar, though more optimistic findings: while a significant 
portion of DSH program dollars are reclaimed by the state, not all states reclaim DSH 
funds. As a result of net Medicaid DSH program dollars (DSH money minus an 
intergovernmental transfer), every hundred dollars spent resulted in a 6.2 percentage 
8 A reimbursement kink exists when a hospital reaches the 20.2 percent DPP; I do not analyze this kink as it does not provide enough variation for me to identify an effect of reimbursement on patient satisfaction.                                                              
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point reduction in infant mortality and a 1.2 percentage point reduction in post-heart 
attack mortality.  
2) Altruism: Non-profit firms (or the managers and contributors to the non-profit firms) may 
be considered more altruistic than for-profit firms. Rose-Ackerman (1996) discusses that 
the utility functions of those who manage non-profits may result in an allocation of 
resources to activities or services which may not be provided in a for-profit environment. 
Donors to (and managers of) non-profits may be incentivized by both a “warm glow” (the 
feeling of well-being when one contributes to a charitable cause), or prestige (others 
know that one has contributed to a charitable cause). Either motivation yields the same 
result: services or resources provided to an institution that does not redistribute the funds 
back to owners (Harbaugh, 1998). Duggan (2000) tests the “altruism” theory by 
measuring the change in costs of care after a change in DSH status of hospitals with 
different ownership. If a non-profit hospital is more altruistic, then one would expect to 
see an increase in the cost of operating a hospital – DSH funds may be allocated to 
purchasing new equipment, hiring more expensive (better) doctors, and so forth. Instead 
of an increase in the cost of operation, Duggan (2000) finds that the Medicaid DSH funds 
are directed to hospital financial holdings and assets.  
3) Ease of access to profits: As previously discussed, non-profit hospitals are legally barred 
from accessing directly any net profit that the non-profit hospital may acquire. Instead, 
the non-profit or public firm may spend the extra resources on quality of care Hansmann, 
1980). From the previous paragraph, Duggan (2000) empirically finds that this is not the 
case for non-profit hospitals.   
10  
Theoretical Model 
To theoretically ascertain the effect of additional reimbursement on hospital quality, I rely on 
previous work by Lindrooth, Bazzoli, and Clement (2006), Hodgkin and McGuire (1994) and 
Meltzer, Chung, and Basu (2002) for the presented theory.  I consider a utility maximizing 
hospital where utility is a function of both profit and quality:  
𝑈(𝜋,𝑄)      (3) 
𝜋 = 𝑀(𝑄) ∗ 𝐷𝑆𝐻 + 𝑂(𝑄) − 𝑐(𝑆) − 𝑐(𝑄)  (4) 
𝑄 ≥ 0      (5) 
𝜋 ≥ 𝜋         (6) 
Equation (3) is the hospital’s utility function, which can vary by hospital. Equation (4), 
the profit function, is a function of hospital quality (Q) and patient illness severity (S): M(Q) is 
the revenue from publicly insured patients (through Medicare or Medicaid) and O(Q) is the 
revenue from “other” insurance types. I directly include quality in the hospital utility function 
because non-profit hospitals may derive additional utility from providing high quality services. I 
keep separate the costs of patient severity and care quality: the cost of treatment of a severely ill 
patient is fundamentally separate from the cost of basic customer service. If one were to consider 
two nurses, identical in skill of patient care, but one with a more pleasing bedside manner than 
the other, the difference in wages between the two nurses could be argued to reflect the 
difference in the nurses’ “people skills.” Hospital quality must be positive or zero, and profits are 
constrained by a floor condition, with the assumption being that if profits are below the floor, the 
hospital either closes or merges with another institution.   
I can substitute (4) into (3) and solve for first order conditions: 
11  
𝑃′(𝑄) + 𝑀′(𝑄) ∗ 𝐷𝑆𝐻 − 𝐶′(𝑄) + 𝑈𝑄
𝑈𝜋
= 0  (7)  
One can totally differentiate the first order conditions to find the change in quality of care when 
DSH payments increase, under the basic assumptions that the revenue functions from publicly 
and privately insured patients are concave with respect to quality and that the cost function is 
convex with respect to quality (𝑀′, 𝑃′,  𝐶′ > 0;  𝑀′′,𝑃′′ < 0 ;   𝐶′′ > 0): 
𝑑𝑄
𝑑𝐷𝑆𝐻
= −𝑀′(𝑄)
𝑃′′(𝑄)+𝑀′′(𝑄)∗𝐷𝑆𝐻−𝐶′′(𝑄) > 0   (8) 
As discussed in Lindrooth et. al, (2006) and Hodgkin and McGuire (1994), when the budget 
constraint is binding, the hospital will choose to offer zero quality. That is, when a hospital has 
no excess profit, no money will be allocated toward increasing hospital quality. An explicit 
assumption in order to arrive at Equation 8 is that the ratio of utilities with respect to quality and 
profit in Equation 7 must be constant. 
The model indicates that when price or Medicare percentage increase, a hospital’s 
average quality offered will increase as a result. The model cannot address whether a different 
quality of care is offered to different patients.  Private insurance reimbursement rates may increase as a result of a rise in Medicare reimbursement rates. The relative attractiveness to hospitals of Medicare admissions, as compared to Medicaid patients or the privately insured, rises when Medicare reimbursement rates rise. In order to ensure that patients in their networks maintain access to the same health care provider networks, insurance companies will raise their reimbursement rates. It is possible that the hospital obtainment of DSH status affects the financial relationship between hospitals and insurance companies. 
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Data 
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) makes publicly available on its 
website the impact files for each fiscal year.9 The impact files contain hospital-aggregated data 
for each individual hospital fiscal year. The data includes information needed for Medicare 
reimbursement adjustment, as well as demographic information that I use for control variables. 
The disjoint timing of each hospital’s fiscal year with the release of the impact files makes any 
interpretation more difficult than if each hospital, state, and the federal government kept the 
same timeline.10 I use the hospital impact files from the fiscal year before each patient survey 
update. If a hospital is considered a DSH hospital at the end of the fiscal year 2006, I estimate 
the impact of this designation on the patients in the fiscal year 2007. 
During the year, a random sample of patients is contacted after their hospital visits to 
answer surveys about their stays. The patients are asked ten questions regarding their hospital 
stays; each hospital collects the data and reports it to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services. The aggregated data are made publicly available by hospital which allows me to 
construct an average overall rating for the hospital and to analyze the hospital rating by specific 
measure. The questions asked are located in Table 3: I ultimately use for analysis the percentage 
of patients who responded that the hospital scored “high” or “very good” in a category. For 
brevity, I call these percentages “hospital ratings.” An easy example is room cleanliness: a 
patient has a choice of three options when asked about how often her room was clean during her 
stay. The choices are: “always,” “sometimes,” or “never” clean. The Hospital Compare data 
reports the percentages of patients who answer affirmatively in each category: if a hospital 
9 https://www.cms.gov, last accessed 3/30/2012 10 Each hospital is legally obligated to submit its cost report once every year, but the hospital can decide when to 
report. The federal fiscal year begins on October 1, and the impact files are released during the late summer and 
before the new fiscal year. The impact files include the information collected since the last Medicare/Medicaid 
update during the fiscal year. 
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treated three patients, and all answer in different ways to the “room cleanliness” question (one 
says “never”, another says “sometimes”, the last says “always”), then the hospital rating is 
calculated to be 33 percent. If instead two patients answer that their room was “always” clean, 
while the third says that the room was “never clean,” then the calculated rating jumps to 66 
percent.  
Demographic Variables 
Disproportionate Patient Percentage: 
A hospital is designated as a “disproportionate share hospital” if the percentage of low-
reimbursement patients (Medicaid patients and Medicare patients who quality for supplemental 
security income) exceeds fifteen percent. At the end of the year a hospital receives additional 
funds from Medicare for patient care if the hospital exceeds the fifteen percent threshold. 
Teaching Status: 
Hospitals with teaching programs receive additional Medicare adjustments to the base 
prospective payment rate set by Medicare. The adjustments are meant to compensate for the 
“learning curve” of residents – diagnostics and equipment may be used at a greater rate than 
would be expected due to the learning environment of the hospital. Despite this, teaching 
hospitals are considered to be the forefront of the medical field and may perform better on the 
measure scores than would otherwise be expected. A dummy variable that captures the teaching 
status of the hospital accounts for fundamental environmental differences in the hospital.  
Hospitals do not change teaching hospital status during the time frame that I analyze, but may 
change the number of residents in the program. To account for this in later analysis, I separate 
teaching hospitals from non-teaching to account for any systematic differentiation in quality 
scores.  
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 Medicare patient days to total days:  
Ultimately, a hospital’s reimbursement rate from Medicare rests on the number of 
number of Medicare patients admitted and whether it admits any Medicare patients at all. If a 
hospital does not admit Medicare patients, a difference in the reimbursement rate would make no 
difference to the reimbursement that a hospital would receive if it were above or below the 
cutoff.  
 Operating and capital costs to Medicare covered charges ratio:  
This number is an indication of how costly the operations (capital and labor) of the 
hospital are – A number less than one indicates that the standard hospital operating costs for care 
are greater than the amount reimbursed by Medicare for care provided, while a number greater 
than one would indicate that the hospital is making a profit from operations. These variables act 
as proxies for different hospital operating environments; it is reasonable to assume that these 
variables will capture differences in hospital equipment and competence of staff. 
 Average daily census and total number of cases: 
These variables capture the difference in aptitude of taking care of a great deal of 
patients; size and number of patients seen may increase the proficiency with which hospitals treat 
patients. Conversely, it is possible that an overcrowding of patients may decrease the approval 
rating of the hospital. The average daily census is the average number of patients seen per day in 
the hospital, while the total number of cases is transfer adjusted – only the patients who stay in 
the hospital are counted. Neither measure depends on patient insurer. 
Estimation  
Identification in a regression-discontinuity design rests on the assumption that, barring 
complete agent manipulation, the likelihood of an observation falling on either side of the cutoff 
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is random. In the case of hospital qualification for DSH funding, hospitals are able to target 
potential patients but are unable to completely manipulate their disproportionate patient 
percentage (Duggan, 2000). I include in the robustness checks a test for hospital selection into 
the Medicare DSH program. 
I explicitly assume that when hospitals are within a certain percentage of the 
disproportionate share hospital qualification cutoff, the allocation of the DSH funds can be 
treated as exogenous because these hospitals are “close” in their disproportionate patient 
percentages and are unable to exactly manipulate this variable. Later, I show the effects of DSH 
status as the percentage from the DSH cutoff changes. 
The regression discontinuity design is estimated in a similar fashion as the difference-in-
differences setup but executes a different strategy for identifying a control group. The hospitals 
that fall short of the DSH cutoff are considered to be the counterfactual of the hospitals directly 
to the right of the cutoff; the assumption that the differences between the hospitals above and 
below the cutoff are either observable and that unobservable characteristics are time-invariant 
allows me to identify the impact of the DSH funds. 
I use hospital ratings as a dependent variable to determine whether hospitals that receive 
a DSH reimbursement are using extra resources in a significantly different way that hospitals that 
are just below the cutoff. The bandwidth is determined using non-parametric cross validation 
methods as described in Lee and Lemieux (2010) and Imbens and Lemieux (2008). Non-
parametrically, I determine the ideal “distance” away from the cutoff of fifteen percent by 
selecting from a range of bandwidths and fitting an estimated curve to the data both above and 
below the cutoff. The bandwidth that yielded the lowest mean squared errors within a restricted 
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sample of five percentage points above and below the cutoff was chosen as the “optimal” 
bandwidth. 
I repeat the procedure for the full sample and then for the subsample of non-profit 
hospitals. Bandwidths of two and three percentage points are chosen for both samples. All of the 
following tables report estimates using the three percent bandwidth selection, unless explicitly 
stated otherwise. I do not repeat the analysis for for-profit and public hospitals due to small 
sample sizes.   
I primarily focus on the effect of DSH hospital payment incentives on non-profit 
hospitals. Non-profit acute care hospitals compose the vast majority of hospital types: 
approximately two-thirds of the hospitals reported by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services in 2009 are non-profit organizations. For-profit, acute care hospitals are a distant second 
in sheer numbers:  20 percent of the 2,452 hospitals in the data are for-profit.  The remaining 328 
hospitals (approximately 13 percent of the data) are publicly owned at the federal, state, or local 
levels. After constraining my sample to hospitals that have a disproportionate share percentage 
just around the cutoff, I am left with approximately 500 hospitals (Table 2). 
To address concerns about unobserved hospital characteristics such as initial reputation, 
span of medical services, presence and size of teaching programs, etc., I include hospital-specific 
fixed effects. Concerns about hospital adaptation to scores and cross-subsidization across 
hospital services (David et al., 2011) may exist if a several-year panel of data were analyzed. For 
this reason, I specifically limit the data to the span of five quarters: I make the assumption that if 
a hospital’s resource allocations changes in response to the HCACPS, the hospital responses are 
gradual and lagged after the public reports of the scores are released. However, to control for 
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wide variation on both sides of the cutoff, I include provider time trends. I include time dummies 
as additional controls.  
 The initial estimating equation is:  
𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡=  α0 +  𝛽1(𝐷𝑆𝐻 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑡−1) +  𝛽2(𝐷𝑆𝐻 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 ∗ % 𝐷𝑆𝐻 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡−1)+  𝛽3(% 𝐷𝑆𝐻 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝜆𝑡 +  𝛼𝑖 + 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 
Here, I estimate the effect of hospital i’s DSH status in the previous year, 𝐷𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑡−1 on 
hospital approval ratings in the next year, 𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡. To allow for hospital ratings to 
have different slopes on either side of the DSH cutoff, I include disproportionate patient 
percentage (% DSH Patients) in time t-1, and the interaction between DSH status and the 
disproportionate patient percentage. This interaction captures any potential difference in patient 
satisfaction trends between hospitals above and below the cutoff.  The regressions include 
whether a hospital qualified for DSH adjustments in the previous year to avoid upward 
simultaneity bias issues with staffing and quality. 
I average all ratings to determine whether hospitals just above or below the DSH cutoff 
have higher ratings on average than those below the cutoff. The ratings can also be separated by 
individual question. I repeat the same analysis for the overall ratings and for the category ratings. 
Additional analysis includes the covariates previously discussed:  
𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡=  α0 +  𝛽1(𝐷𝑆𝐻 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑡−1) +  𝛽2(𝐷𝑆𝐻 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 ∗ % 𝐷𝑆𝐻 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡−1)+  𝛽3(% 𝐷𝑆𝐻 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝑿𝒊𝒕′ 𝜷 +  𝜆𝑡 +  𝛼𝑖 + 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 
A testable implication provided by the model is that hospitals with a large Medicare 
population, or "bite," will have a greater increase in quality than those with a low Medicare 
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population, all else equal. Empirical evidence supporting this hypothesis is mixed: Kaestner and 
Guardardo (2008) use hospital geographic reclassification11 as exogenous variation, finding that 
nursing-intensive patient outcomes, such as the presence of hospital acquired urinary tract 
infections and pressure ulcers, are unaffected by changes in Medicare reimbursement of up to 10 
percent. Contrary to this finding, Lindrooth et al. (2006) and Bazzoli et al. (2004) create financial 
pressure indices that account for the Medicare reimbursement reductions as a result of the 1997 
Balanced Budget Act (BBA). These results indicate that nurse-to-patient ratios and patient 
lengths of stay decrease, while outpatient visits increase as a result of financial pressure. Wu and 
Shen (2011) estimate the long-term effects of Medicare reimbursement cuts on hospitals by 
instrumenting reimbursements with a "BBA bite" index and a Medicare patient volume. With 
these two instruments, the authors are able to determine whether changing Medicare patient 
volume or hospital "BBA bites" affected adjusted acute myocardial infarction (AMI) patient 
mortality rates. The authors find that all discharged patient mortality rates significantly increased 
by 0.7 to 1.6 percentage points as a result of a hospital's position in the top decile of BBA 
reimbursement cuts. The authors find that nurse staffing ratios decreased significantly in the long 
term as a result of declines in hospital reimbursement.  
I conduct a quantile regression analysis to determine the effect of large Medicare 
populations and Medicare DSH status on average hospital quality. The purpose of this quantile 
regression estimation is to determine how the effects of a hospital’s Medicare population differ 
across parts of the score distribution. Understandably, if a hospital has a high score, which 
corresponds to a high percentile in the distribution, the effects of additional reimbursement due 
to the hospital’s Medicare population will be close to zero. Alternatively, for hospitals with low 
ratings, the additional reimbursement from a high Medicare population may have a larger impact 
11 A hospital’s geographic classification directly affects the hospital’s Medicare reimbursement percentage.                                                               
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on hospital quality scores than the reimbursement for hospitals with a smaller Medicare 
population. I estimate the following equation:  
𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡=  α0 +  𝛽1(𝐷𝑆𝐻 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑡−1) +  𝛽2(𝐷𝑆𝐻 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 ∗ % 𝐷𝑆𝐻 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡−1)+  𝛽3(% 𝐷𝑆𝐻 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡−1)+ 𝛽4(𝐷𝑆𝐻 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒) + 𝑿𝒊𝒕′ 𝜷 +  𝜆𝑡 +  𝛼𝑖+ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 
The coefficient of interest, 𝛽4, is the effect on quality of Medicare DSH reimbursement due to 
different hospital Medicare populations. I expect a nonnegative coefficient estimate, and 
interpret the coefficient as the effect on quality of a larger level of Medicare DSH 
reimbursement. 
I do not include hospital fixed effects in the quantile regressions, but do include basic hospital 
characteristics: urban, teaching, and ownership dummies. By estimating a quantile regression, I 
test whether a large Medicare population affects hospital quality and also whether different 
quantiles of the score distribution are dissimilarly affected. 
Results 
 All Owners versus Non-Profit  
I find that DSH hospital status on average increases the hospital’s overall rating in the 
full sample by six percentage points (Table 4). When I stratify by non-profit hospitals in columns 
3 and 4, this effect jumps to a little under seven percentage points - which translates to roughly a 
ten percent increase in average hospital rating. After the inclusion of covariates, this effect 
remains statistically significant and stable. For the non-profit hospital subsample, the coefficient 
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on the interaction term is strongly negative and significant both before and after the addition of 
covariates. The cost of an increase of low-income patients may not be fully compensated by the 
DSH payments, and as a result stretching further the hospital’s resources. The positive 
coefficient on the DPP variable captures a hospital’s increasing ability to provide care as the 
number of challenging cases increases.12  
In the categorical regressions for the full sample (Table 5), DSH status raises the doctor 
communication ratings measure by eight percentage points. The effect on the other categories is 
generally positive, but statistically insignificant. Hospitals may choose to distribute their 
reimbursements differently, which increases the noise of my estimates but leads to an overall 
positive effect of DSH status on hospital quality. DSH hospital status has a positive impact on all 
categories when non-profit hospitals are analyzed (Table 6). The largest and statistically 
significant difference that DSH status has on non-profit hospitals is in the hospital cleanliness, 
doctor communication, and nurse communication categories, at just under fourteen, nine, and 
eight percentage points, respectively.  
Quantile Regression Results 
 
Table 7 reports the quantile regression estimates. I find that the average quality effects of 
Medicare DSH reimbursement are primarily driven by the increases in the lower quantiles of the 
score distribution. Columns 1 and 2 report the estimates of DSH status and increased Medicare 
admissions on the 25th and 50th percentile of the score distribution for the full sample of 
hospitals. An increase in DSH reimbursement insignificantly increases a hospital’s average score 
12 The point estimates of the effect of hospital attainment of DSH status on hospital quality after inclusion of quadratic and cubic estimates increase, but are statistically insignificant. For robustness, I show that the point estimates of DSH status on average quality scores estimated using local linear regressions are robust to bandwidth selection. However, the regression results with the inclusion of quadratic and cubic terms are available upon request.  
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by ten percentage points, whereas a ten percentage point increase in Medicare admissions 
increases a hospital’s average quality score by approximately one percentage point. As expected, 
the effect of the increased Medicare admissions disappears in the 75th percentile of the 
distribution (Column 3). 
Columns 4 through 6 report quantile regression results for the subsample of non-profit 
hospitals. I find that hospitals in the 25th and 50th percentiles are similarly affected by an increase 
in Medicare reimbursement through DSH status and also through large numbers of Medicare 
patient admissions. The effects for non-profit hospitals are similar in magnitude to the estimates 
for all hospital owners. A ten percentage point increase in Medicare admissions increases 
average hospital quality in hospitals that qualify for DSH status by approximately one percentage 
point.   
Robustness 
 Hospital Manipulation and Robustness to Bandwidth Selection  
Imbens (2008) and Lemieux (2010) discuss that care should be taken when implementing 
a study that uses a regression discontinuity design. One of the explicit assumptions with the 
design is that the running variable cannot be fully manipulated, but partial manipulation does not 
invalidate the experiment. Full manipulation of the running variable renders the experiment 
invalid, due to selection. The classic example, and the first use, of regression discontinuity is that 
of a financial award based on student test scores: students are aware of the score cutoff for 
financial aid and may adjust study behavior accordingly, but are unable to fully control the 
outcome of the test. The same principle holds for DSH hospital status: hospitals are aware of the 
cutoff and may target Medicaid and SSI Medicare patients for admission, but ultimately cannot 
fully control how many patients are admitted to the hospital. 
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In Figure 1, I include a standardized frequency histogram of the running variable, 
hospital disproportionate patient percentage. One can see that there exists an upward slope to the 
DSH percentage but no jump in the smoothed frequencies at the DSH status cutoff. I use 
McCrary’s test to test for hospital manipulation of the disproportionate patient percentage. 
McCrary’s test of manipulation of the running variable formalizes the rejection of hospital 
manipulation of the disproportionate share percentage. I run the tests at a bandwidth slightly 
above and at the optimal bandwidth of the non-profit subsample for reassurance that selection 
does not occur in the immediate vicinity of the optimal bandwidth. 
I implement a placebo discontinuity at 12 percent of DPP and find the estimated effect of 
the placebo cutoff on patient satisfaction surveys and quality scores by running the same local 
linear regressions with the same bandwidths (Table 8). On average, I find that the placebo DSH 
status increases average hospital ratings by a negative 1.2 to a positive 1.7 percentage points, and 
nothing is statistically significant.13 
To ensure that my findings are robust to the choice of bandwidth, I include graphs that 
illustrate the average effect of DSH status as bandwidth increases (Figures 2-3). The effect of 
DSH status remains greater than zero until approximately 3 percent away from the cutoff. This 
attenuation could be due to imperfect hospital selection of patients or differences in hospitals due 
to unobservable variables.  
Cross Section versus Fixed Effects  
I estimate the effect of DSH status in cross sectional regressions that contain a lagged 
outcome variable. The coefficient of DSH status in the linear cross-sectional regressions is 
13 The procedure is not included for a placebo at 18% or above because hospital eligibility increases for Medicaid DSH reimbursement and additional Medicare DSH reimbursement. The increased hospital eligibility for the reimbursement programs disqualifies any group above 18% as a suitable placebo group. 
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similar in magnitude (within a percentage point) to the linear fixed-effects regressions and is 
statistically significant. Inclusion of quadratic and cubic expressions increases both the 
magnitude and significance of the estimates, but provides implausibly large estimates of the 
effects of DSH status. This is likely due to the small bandwidth of 3%. 
I am comfortable interpreting the fixed-effect regression estimates as unbiased estimates 
of the true effect of a hospital’s DSH status attainment.  
Cost Effectiveness   Most medical research compares patient satisfaction in hospitals in a cross-section but 
cannot provide any causal inference about hospital characteristics and hospital ratings. Despite 
this weakness, Jha et al. (2008) provide useful numbers from which I can draw a comparison: 
after including hospital characteristics, a move from the lowest quartile of nurse to patient-day 
ratios to the highest quartile is associated with a 5 percentage point change in overall hospital 
ratings. A move from teaching to non-teaching status is associated with a 0.5 percentage point 
increase in hospital ratings.  
 Similar correlations occur in the categorical ratings. A move from hospitals in the lowest 
quartile of nurse to patient-days ratios (those with the fewest nurses to patients) to hospitals in 
the highest quartile of nurse to patient-days ratios is correlated with a maximum of a seven 
percentage point increase in the categorical rankings, with the most improvement in the metrics 
that quantify satisfaction with nurse communication and hospital recommendation to others. 
Kutney-Lee et al. (2009) find that improvements in nurse working environments, as measured by 
nurse leadership, nurse standards for quality care, and nurse-physician relationships, are 
associated with a maximum of a four percentage point increase in categorical hospital ratings. 
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 My findings, relative to the previous published work discussed above, are large in 
magnitude. For comparison, I can roughly calculate the amount of money that a six percentage 
point increase in hospital satisfaction would cost if the money were dedicated solely to an 
increase in nursing staff. Kutney-Lee et al. (2009) report an average of 5.3 patients per nurse in 
hospitals with a poor work environment and an average of 4.6 patients per nurse in hospitals that 
have productive (as determined by a “productivity index”) work environments. If I make the 
(admittedly unrealistic) assumption that the only difference between these hospitals is the nurse 
to patient ratio, and assume that nurses make approximately 70,000 dollars per year, then a six 
percentage point increase in hospital ratings would correspond to a change from approximately a 
5:1 patient-to-nurse ratio to a 1:1 patient-to-nurse ratio, distributional assumptions aside. If the 
hospital operates at a capacity of 200 patients per day, year round, then the costs of maintaining a 
1:1 patient to nurse ratio would be fourteen million dollars per year.  
If I assume that a hospital is reimbursed 5,000 dollars per patient and discharges 6,000 
patients per year, then the hospital receives approximately 750,000 dollars in DSH money (the 
DSH reimbursement is an additional 2.5 percent of the prospective payment rate). The DSH 
program is relatively more cost-effective in improving patient satisfaction than a program that 
focuses solely on nurse staffing.  
Policy Implications 
The disproportionate share adjustment was designed to reimburse hospitals for a higher 
cost of care for large numbers of the indigent population. However, it appears that a large 
number of hospitals that receive these funds have higher hospital ratings than those that do not. 
This paper reveals that hospitals that are DSH eligible tend to have cleaner patient facilities and 
better doctor and nurse communication than those who do not receive the funds: evidence 
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presented here suggests that this effect is primarily driven by the quality increase in care 
provided by lower performing hospitals after receiving Medicare DSH funds. It is unclear 
whether hospitals that fall short of the DSH qualifications do not have the resources to maintain 
proper medical or maintenance staff or whether those hospitals that receive the DSH adjustment 
are expanding current programs because they are no longer constrained by the cost of current 
care. Lindrooth et al. (2006) suggests the former. However, one could consider the improvement 
of hospital service as a response to the attainment of DSH status to be a legitimate hospital 
response to meet the needs of a higher resource-intensive patient population.  
A simple way to test this is to examine yearly hospital cost report data: differences in 
what hospitals are spending on patients could potentially be found in cost-center level data.    It is also possible that hospitals use DSH reimbursement to fund structural improvement. The Federal government offers a substantial subsidization for the installment of hospital electronic medical records (EMR) systems. However, the EMR installment is not costless for health services providers. One mechanism through which the DSH payments could improve hospital performance on patient satisfaction measures is to reduce the cost of communication between physicians and nurses, and between health care providers and patients.  
Implications for the Affordable Care Act   The current passage of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) will lead to many more 
individuals insured through either Medicaid or private insurance. As a direct result of the 
increase in the number of insured, the federal government plans to reduce, and ultimately, 
eliminate the Medicare disproportionate share adjustment. The implications for the elimination 
of the program are unclear: the previous analysis shows that the disproportionate share payments 
are used, at least in part, by hospitals to increase staff quality. This increase in staff quality could 
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be considered necessary (i.e. hospitals were operating at low staff levels because of an inability 
to pay salaries) or could be viewed as excessive, in that the DSH payments cover the cost of 
indigent care and additionally subsidize an expansion of hospital operation.   
Conclusion 
 The historical test of hospital quality has been to examine hospital mortality rates for 
various conditions. However, the recent availability of consumer satisfaction surveys has 
allowed for a different, precise, estimation of hospital quality. This research finds that 
disproportionate share status increases hospital ratings by six percentage points across all 
owners, jumping to over six percentage points when non-profits are isolated. Extensive 
robustness checks of these results do not invalidate my findings.  
Future research involves hospital cost-center level comparisons of hospitals with DSH 
status. 
 
 
 
References 
 
 
Spending and Enrollment Detail for CBO's March 2009 Baseline: Medicaid 2009, [Homepage of 
Congressional Budget Office], [Online]. Available: 
http://www.cbo.gov/budget/factsheets/2009b/medicaid.pdf [2012, 2/3]. 
 
"ACGME | Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education " 2/13/2012 
<http://www.acgme.org/acWebsite/home/home.asp>. 
Angrist, Joshua, and Jörn-Steffen Pischke. 2009. “Mostly harmless econometrics: An empiricist's 
companion”. Princeton University Press.  
Baicker, Katherine, and Douglas Staiger. "Fiscal Shenanigans, Targeted Federal Health Care 
Funds, and Patient Mortality." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 120.1 (2005): 345-86.  
 
27  
Bazzoli, G., R.C. Lindrooth, R. Hasnain-Wynia, and J. Needleman. “The Balanced Budget Act 
of 1997 and US Hospital Operations.” Inquiry 41 (Winter 2004/2005): 401-417.  
 
Cutler, David M., Robert S. Ilckman, and Mary Beth Landrum. 2004. "The Role of Information 
in Medical Markets: An Analysis of Publicly Reported Outcomes in Cardiac Surgery." 
American Economic Review, 94.2 (2004): 342–346. 
 
Dafny, L., & Dranove, D.” Do Report Cards tell Consumers Anything They Don't Already 
Know? The Case of Medicare HMOs.” The Rand Journal of Economics, 39.3, (2008): 790-
821. 
 
David, Guy, et al. Do Hospitals Cross Subsidize?. National Bureau of Economic Research 
(2011).  
 
Duggan, Mark G. "Hospital Ownership and Public Medical Spending." The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 115.4 (2000): 1343-1373.  
 
Goodnough, Abby. Massachusetts in Suit Over Cost of Universal Care – The New York Times. 
Available: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/16/us/16hospital.html  [2012, 8/6/2012]. 
 
Fetter, Robert B., et al. "Case Mix Definition by Diagnosis-Related Groups." Medical care 18.2, 
Supplement: Case Mix Definition by Diagnosis-Related Groups (1980): pp. i+iii+v+ix+1-
53.  
 
Hansmann, Henry B. "The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise." The Yale Law Journal 89.5 (1980): 
835-901.  
 
“The Prestige Motive for Making Charitable Transfers.” Harbaugh, William T. American 
Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 88.2 (1998): 277-82. 
 
Hodgkin, Dominic, and Thomas G. McGuire. "Payment Levels and Hospital Response to 
Prospective Payment." Journal of Health Economics 13.1 (1994): 1-29.  
 
Huang, Z. “Calculating Hospital Specific DRG Payments,” Technical Note no. TN-004 
(revised), 8 August 2008, http://www.resdac.umn.edu/Tools/TBs/TN-
004_CalculatingHospitalDRG_508.pdf (accessed 1 November, 2011). 
 
Jung, Kyoungrae, Roger Feldman, and Dennis Scanlon. "Where would You Go for Your Next 
Hospitalization?" Journal of Health Economics In Press, Corrected Proof.  
Kaestner, R., & Guardado, J.. Medicare reimbursement, nurse staffing, and patient outcomes. 
Journal of Health Economics, 27.2 (2008): 339-361.  
Kutney-Lee, A., McHugh, M.D., Sloane, D.M., Cimiotti, J.P., Flynn, L., Neff, D.F. & Aiken, 
L.H. "Nursing: A Key To Patient Satisfaction", Health Affairs, 28.4, (July/August 2009): 
w669-w677. 
28  
 
Lehrman, W. G., Elliott, M. N., Goldstein, E., Beckett, M. K., Klein, D. J., & Giordano, L. A.. 
Characteristics of hospitals demonstrating superior performance in patient experience and 
clinical process measures of care. Medical Care Research and Review, 67.1, (2010): 38-55. 
 
Lindrooth, Richard C., et al. "The Effect of Changes in Hospital Reimbursement on Nurse 
Staffing Decisions at Safety Net and Nonsafety Net Hospitals." Health Services Research 
41.3p1 (2006): 701-20.  
 
McCrary, Justin. Manipulation of the Running Variable in the Regression Discontinuity Design: 
A Density Test. National Bureau of Economic Research (2007).  
 
Meltzer, David, Jeanette Chung, and Anirban Basu. "Does Competition Under Medicare 
Prospective Payment Selectively Reduce Expenditures on High-Cost Patients?" The Rand 
Journal of Economics 33.3 (2002): 447-468.  
 
Mukamel, Dana B., and Alvin I. Mushlin. "Quality of Care Information Makes a Difference: An 
Analysis of Market Share and Price Changes After Publication of the New York State 
Cardiac Surgery Mortality Reports." Medical Care 36.7 (1998): 945-954.  
 
Pardes, Herbert, and Edward D. Miller. "We Can’t Afford to Train Fewer Doctors; the Savings 
from Government Funding Cuts to Graduate Medical Education Aren’t Worth the Negative 
Effect on Patients." Wall Street Journal (Online) (2011). 
  
Imbens, Guido W., and Thomas Lemieux. “Regression Discontinuity Designs: A Guide to 
Practice.” Journal of Econometrics 142 (2008):615–35. 
 
Jha, A.K., Orav, E.J., Zheng, J. & Epstein, A.M. "Patients' Perception of Hospital Care in the 
United States", N Engl J Med, 359.18, (2008): 1921-1931. 
 
Rodgers, Jack, Nancy M. Gordon, and Kathryn M. Langwell. Medicare's Disproportionate Share 
Adjustment for Hospitals. The Congress of the United States Congressional Budget Office, 
1990. 
 
Rose-Ackerman, Susan. "Altruism, Nonprofits, and Economic Theory." Journal of Economic 
Literature 34.2 (1996): 701-728.  
 
"Social Security Act §1923 " 11/1/2011 <http://www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/ssact/title19/1923.htm>.  
 
Werner, Rachel M., et al. "Do Consumers Respond to Publicly Reported Quality Information? 
Evidence from Nursing Homes." Journal of Health Economics 31.1 (2012): 50-61. 
 
Werner Rachel M., M, Goldman L,Dudley R. "Comparison of change in quality of care between 
safety-net and non–safety-net hospitals", JAMA: The Journal of the American Medical 
Association, 299.18, (2008): pp. 2180-2187. 
 
29  
Wu, V. Y., & Shen, Y. The Long-Term Impact of Medicare Payment Reductions on Patient 
Outcomes National Bureau of Economic Research (2011). 
 
   
 
 
 
 
  
30  
 
 
 Table 1.1: Reimbursement Rules for Disproportionate Share Hospitals 
 
 
Hospital Type: Beds DPP Threshold Adjustment Note: 
          
Urban  0-99 >= .15, < = .202 .025+ [.65*(DPP- .15)]  Can't exceed .12 
    > .202 .0588+ [.825*(DPP- .202)]  Can't exceed .12 
          
Urban  >= 100 >= .15, < = .202 .025+ [.65*(DPP- .15)] No cap  
    > .202 .0588+ [.825*(DPP- .202)] No cap  
          
Rural Referral Center All >= .15, < = .202 .025+ [.65*(DPP- .15)] No cap  
    > .202 .0588+ [.825*(DPP- .202)] No cap  
          
Medicare Dependent 
Hospital  All >= .15, < = .202 .025+ [.65*(DPP- .15)] No cap  
    > .202 .0588+ [.825*(DPP- .202)] No cap  
          
Other rural  0-499 >= .15, < = .202 .025+ [.65*(DPP- .15)]  Can't exceed .12 
    > .202 .0588+ [.825*(DPP- .202)]  Can't exceed .12 
          
  >=500 >= .15, < = .202 .025+ [.65*(DPP- .15)] No cap  
    > .202 .0588+ [.825*(DPP- .202)] No cap    
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Table 1.2: Control Variables, Above and Below the 15% DPP Cutoff 
 
           
DSH < .15 DSH >= .15 DSH < .15 DSH >= .15 
Disproportionate Patient Percentage 0.13 0.17 0.13 0.17 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Operating Cost to Medicare  
Reimbursement 0.38 0.36 0.40 0.38 
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.14) 
Capital Cost to Medicare  
Reimbursement 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
Percent Patients Medicare 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 
(0.47) (0.47) (0.47) (0.47) 
Number of transfer-adjusted cases 4371 4600 4681 4810 
(3210) (3352) (3351) (3467) 
Average Daily Census 130 138 140 146 
(0108) (0113) (0116) (0118) 
Teaching 0.37 0.40 0.45 0.45 
(0.48) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) 
Number of Providers 408 522 315 390 
Standard Deviations in Parentheses.  
Note: The number of providers on either side of the DSH cutoff is not stationary through time. 
Non-Profit All Owners 
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Table 1.3: Consumer Assessment Questions and Hospital Rating Answers  
Question:    Patient Response:     Mean  Std. Dev.  
 
How often was the area 
around patient's rooms 
kept quiet at night?  
 
 Always quiet at night   0.528 0.1022 
How often did the nurses 
communicate well with 
patients? 
  
 Nurses always communicated well   0.716 0.0693 
How often was the 
patient's pain well 
controlled?  
 
 Pain was always well controlled 
  
0.665 0.0609 
How often were the 
patient's rooms and 
bathrooms kept clean?  
 
 Room was always clean   0.660 0.0757 
How often did patients 
receive help quickly 
from hospital staff?  
 
 Patients always received help as soon as they wanted 0.583 0.0851 
How often did staff 
explain about medicines 
before giving them to 
patients?  
 
 Staff always explained   0.565 0.0676 
How do the patients rate 
the hospital overall?  
  
Patients who gave a rating of 9 or 10 (high) 
  
0.627 0.0959 
Would the patients 
recommend the hospital 
to friends and family?  
 
 Yes, patients would definitely recommend the hospital 0.675 0.1045 
Were patients given 
information about what 
to do during their 
recovery at home? 
 
 Yes, staff did give patients this information   0.791 0.0543 
How often did doctors 
communicate well with 
patients?  
 
  Doctors always communicated well   0.778 0.0549 
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Table 1.4: Overall Satisfaction Regression 
 
 
   
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES
Average 
Quality 
Average 
Quality 
Average 
Quality 
Average 
Quality 
Medicare DSH Hospital 0.0569* 0.0592* 0.0616 0.0664*
(0.0341) (0.0347) (0.0383) (0.0390)
DSH Hospital X DPP -0.420* -0.415* -0.478* -0.454*
(0.225) (0.234) (0.251) (0.258)
DPP 0.398** 0.345** 0.480*** 0.415**
(0.155) (0.165) (0.174) (0.186)
Medicare Percentage X DSH 0.00748 0.00118 0.0134 0.00448
(0.0194) (0.0193) (0.0211) (0.0226)
Medicare Percentage 0.00992 0.0141 0.00277 0.0100
(0.0401) (0.0401) (0.0445) (0.0451)
Constant 0.595*** 0.632*** 0.590*** 0.618***
(0.0307) (0.0390) (0.0340) (0.0467)
Observations 1,533 1,521 1,171 1,159
R-squared 0.744 0.751 0.755 0.763
Number of providern 518 513 393 388
Covariates No Yes No Yes
State Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Provider Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quadratic No No No No
Cubic No No No No
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robust standard errors in parentheses
All Owners Non-Profit
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Table 1.5: Categorical Results for Full Sample (With Covariates) 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES
Patient considers 
excellent hospital
Pain was 
always well 
managed
Rooms / 
Bathrooms 
were always 
clean
Doctors always 
communicated 
well
Nurses always 
communicated 
well
Medicare DSH Hospital 0.0540 0.0471 0.0874 0.0840** 0.0656
(0.0537) (0.0535) (0.0654) (0.0378) (0.0440)
DSH X DPP -0.400 -0.292 -0.723 -0.609** -0.449
(0.357) (0.344) (0.461) (0.267) (0.297)
Disproportionate Patient Percentage 0.306 0.404 0.779** 0.528*** 0.500**
(0.293) (0.265) (0.311) (0.199) (0.213)
Constant 0.717*** 0.577*** 0.552*** 0.651*** 0.706***
(0.0813) (0.0700) (0.0746) (0.0507) (0.0529)
Observations 1,521 1,521 1,521 1,521 1,521
R-squared 0.733 0.666 0.676 0.690 0.660
Number of Providers 513 513 513 513 513
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Provider Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Provider Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
VARIABLES
Staff always 
provided 
information 
Would definitely 
recommend to 
friends
Area outside 
room was 
always quiet
Always 
received help 
when needed
Discharge 
information was 
given 
Medicare DSH Hospital 0.000548 0.130* 0.0966 0.0672 -0.0280
(0.0599) (0.0712) (0.0713) (0.0603) (0.0371)
DSH X DPP -0.167 -0.924** -0.670 -0.480 0.162
(0.391) (0.436) (0.517) (0.392) (0.238)
Disproportionate Patient Percentage 0.412 0.532** 0.129 0.267 -0.0230
(0.293) (0.240) (0.329) (0.313) (0.170)
Constant 0.465*** 0.714*** 0.576*** 0.582*** 0.842***
(0.0675) (0.0820) (0.0718) (0.0774) (0.0448)
Observations 1,521 1,521 1,521 1,521 1,521
R-squared 0.687 0.624 0.732 0.705 0.740
Number of Providers 513 513 513 513 513
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Provider Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Provider Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.6: Categorical Results for Non-Profit Subsample (With Covariates)  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES
Patient considers 
excellent hospital
Pain was 
always well 
managed
Rooms / 
Bathrooms 
were always 
clean
Doctors always 
communicated 
well
Nurses always 
communicated 
well
Medicare DSH Hospital 0.0836 0.0623 0.133** 0.0927** 0.0761*
(0.0642) (0.0672) (0.0669) (0.0410) (0.0460)
DSH X DPP -0.541 -0.419 -0.990** -0.682** -0.478
(0.423) (0.451) (0.433) (0.274) (0.305)
Disproportionate Patient Percentage 0.402 0.469 1.030*** 0.622*** 0.526**
(0.351) (0.352) (0.312) (0.209) (0.242)
Constant 0.718*** 0.561*** 0.453*** 0.646*** 0.662***
(0.0902) (0.0732) (0.0790) (0.0563) (0.0600)
Observations 1,159 1,159 1,159 1,159 1,159
R-squared 0.764 0.678 0.749 0.728 0.701
Number of providers 388 388 388 388 388
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Provider Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Provider Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
VARIABLES
Staff always 
provided 
information 
Would definitely 
recommend to 
friends
Area outside 
room was 
always quiet
Always 
received help 
when needed
Discharge 
information was 
given 
Medicare DSH Hospital -0.0107 0.152 0.0110 0.0798 -0.0397
(0.0590) (0.0958) (0.0725) (0.0692) (0.0456)
DSH X DPP -0.0981 -0.911 0.138 -0.649 0.270
(0.383) (0.594) (0.489) (0.469) (0.299)
Disproportionate Patient Percentage 0.167 0.535* -0.240 0.458 -0.00508
(0.301) (0.277) (0.356) (0.375) (0.204)
Constant 0.517*** 0.736*** 0.615*** 0.547*** 0.858***
(0.0612) (0.0968) (0.0815) (0.0883) (0.0522)
Observations 1,159 1,159 1,159 1,159 1,159
R-squared 0.724 0.624 0.768 0.739 0.753
Number of providers 388 388 388 388 388
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Provider Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Provider Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.7: Quantile Regression Results, Medicare Percentage and DSH Status  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All Owners Non-Profits
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Average 
Quality
Average 
Quality
Average 
Quality
Average 
Quality
Average 
Quality
Average 
Quality
VARIABLES q25 q50 q75 q25 q50 q75
Medicare DSH Hospital 0.107 0.0966 0.0286 0.253 0.109 0.0345
(0.0797) (0.111) (0.105) (0.163) (0.134) (0.112)
DSH Hospital X DPP -0.936* -0.932 -0.346 -1.984** -1.241 -0.576
(0.530) (0.675) (0.682) (0.957) (0.866) (0.693)
DPP 0.322 0.580 0.252 0.910* 0.841 0.584
(0.543) (0.504) (0.548) (0.495) (0.648) (0.584)
Medicare Percentage X DSH Hospital 0.0743** 0.0738* 0.0308 0.108** 0.141*** 0.0765
(0.0325) (0.0431) (0.0497) (0.0430) (0.0414) (0.0504)
Medicare Percentage 0.00436 0.0167 -0.0289 -0.0136 -0.0178 -0.0460
(0.0568) (0.0602) (0.0508) (0.0691) (0.0674) (0.0577)
Constant 0.691*** 0.681*** 0.732*** 0.538*** 0.586*** 0.637***
(0.0951) (0.114) (0.109) (0.0894) (0.0952) (0.0895)
Observations 980 980 980 725 725 725
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Provider Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quadratic No No No No No No
Cubic No No No No No No
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Regressions conducted using a linear bandwidth of 2%. 
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Figure 1.1: McCrary Plot for Manipulation of DPP 
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Figure 1.2: Robustness of Bandwidth Choice, All Hospitals  
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Figure 1.3: Robustness of Bandwidth Choice, Non-Profit Hospitals  
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Table 1.8: Placebo Discontinuity Regressions  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Average Quality Average Quality Average Quality Average Quality
Medicare DSH Hospital -0.0120 -0.00495 0.00493 0.0175
(0.0285) (0.0297) (0.0293) (0.0318)
DSH Hospital X DPP 0.102 0.0588 -0.0491 -0.162
(0.238) (0.236) (0.243) (0.240)
DPP -0.0526 -0.0221 0.118 0.189
(0.177) (0.175) (0.183) (0.175)
Constant 0.662*** 0.706*** 0.646*** 0.702***
(0.0189) (0.0434) (0.0209) (0.0431)
Observations 1,321 1,306 1,007 1,000
R-squared 0.751 0.754 0.762 0.769
Number of Providers 435 424 324 318
Covariates No Yes No Yes
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Provider Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Provider Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quadratic No No No No
Cubic No No No No
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All Owners Non-Profit
DPP = 12%
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Chapter 2:  Do Hospitals React to Penalties? The Impact 
of Financial Penalties on Hospital Score Reporting 
Behavior                      
42  
Introduction 
In 2005, the Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services (CMS) implemented Hospital 
Compare, a program dedicated to publicly reporting hospital quality information. Participation in 
Hospital Compare is voluntary, but the CMS provides a financial incentive for hospitals to 
submit quality scores to the program. The financial penalty for non-reporting changed for federal 
fiscal year 2007: I measure the impact that the changed CMS incentive had on hospital rates of 
participation in Hospital Compare.   
The CMS created Hospital Compare in early 2003, and by 2009, over 3,200 hospitals 
participated in the program by submitting scores on a number of specific, clinically-evaluated, 
measures that improve specific patient population outcomes. Public knowledge of Hospital 
Compare is low: in 2008, only 6% of Americans were aware of the existence of the program 
despite previous efforts in 2007 to publicize both the program and local hospital quality. Despite 
little common knowledge of Hospital Compare, hospital quality scores are used by state 
governments, health care researchers, and anecdotally, hospitals themselves, to track progress in 
the quality of health care services. Wide industry use of the data indicates that the scores hold 
some value for Hospital Compare participants and that non-participation in the program in itself 
sends a signal about the quality of a hospital.  It is also likely that the 20% of Americans in 2008 
who reported familiarity with hospital quality information were viewing Hospital Compare 
information from an alternate source, instead of the original Hospital Compare website (Kaiser, 
2008).  
 Initially, Hospital Compare publicly posted hospital "scores" for clinically appropriate 
measures that span three conditions: heart attacks (acute myocardial infarction), heart failure, and 
pneumonia. In essence, these measures comprise a standardized medical treatment checklist for 
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hospitals to apply to each patient admitted with one of the three conditions. Hospital Compare 
reports the percent of the time that a hospital adheres to the medical checklist. 
Complete non-participation in Hospital Compare came with a reimbursement penalty. 
Acute care hospitals were informed that they must participate in the program by submitting 
patient-level quality scores for 10 “starter measures” in order to receive the full insurance 
reimbursement for treatment of Medicare patients. Hospital non-reporting of the remaining 9 
measures was penalty-free, in that a hospital was not financially compelled by the government to 
collect or publicly report performance data for the rest of the measures. I refer to these measures 
as "non-starter" measures.  
During the first two years of the program, the reimbursement penalty for non-reporting of 
the starter measures was 0.4 percent; after 2007, this penalty rose to a punitive 2.0 percent and 
expanded to require reporting of 21 total measures. Hospitals were informed approximately six 
months in advance of the expansion of the penalty to the non-starter measures. Data collection 
began in 2004, and the data were published on the Hospital Compare website in 2005. 
Use of hospital quality data in economics research is rare: Jung, Feldman, and Scanlon (JHE, 
2011) use the early hospital compare data to examine the effect of hospital quality and patient 
preferences on patient hospital choice, and recent unpublished work by Huang (2011) explores 
the impact of hospital quality on inpatient reimbursement rates. Neither of these works discusses, 
in depth, the voluntary nature of Hospital Compare.  
 Critical access hospitals are exempt from the Hospital Compare program. These specific 
hospitals are small, geographically remote, hospitals that serve the purpose of providing access 
to hospital services in rural areas. Medicare reimbursement to critical access hospitals is cost-
based, thus rendering them exempt from the Hospital Compare reimbursement penalties. Despite 
44  
the absence of a financial incentive to report, critical access hospitals report scores from 2005 
through 2009. I estimate the impact of the change in the CMS penalty on Hospital Compare 
starter measure participation rates of acute-care hospitals using a difference-in-differences 
strategy. Critical access hospital starter measure reporting rates are the first control group for the 
starter measure analysis. 
Critical access hospitals may not be the most appropriate control group for the starter 
measure analysis because of the remote nature of the hospitals, potentially different patient 
populations, and different reimbursement schemes. I address the inadequacy of using critical 
access hospital reporting rates as a control group by including hospital time trends in my 
empirical estimation as well as additionally using acute-care starter measure reporting rates as a 
control group to estimate the change in penalty on non-starter measures. I am able to conclude 
that the estimates from using acute care starter measures are an underestimate of the true effect 
because starter measures are also subject to a financial penalty for non-reporting.  
  Another way to estimate the effect of a change in penalty rates is to directly include the 
penalty percentage for the measures in the regressions. I estimate the effect of a percentage 
change in reimbursement penalty for both starter and non-starter measures, and compute the 
marginal effects of a change from 0.4 percent to 2 percent for starter measures and similarly no 
penalty to 2 percent for non-starter measures.  
The primary estimates for the effect of a change in reimbursement from 0.4 percent to 2 
percent on the reporting rates of the starter measures are close to zero in magnitude. The largest 
estimate that I am able to provide for the change in reimbursement penalty on the reporting rate 
of the starter measures is an effect of 2 percentage points, translated into just over a 2 percent 
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change in reporting rates. Most of my estimates of the effect of a change in penalty rates on 
starting measure reporting rates are statistically insignificant and extremely close to zero. 
The effect of the change in penalty for non-starter measures, from 0 to 2 percent, on acute 
care reporting rates is much larger in magnitude than the effect for starter measures. For all 
estimates, I find a maximum penalty effect of 7.5 percentage points (about an 8.5 percent 
increase), and a minimum of about 4.5 percentage points in regressions that likely may produce 
estimates with a downward bias. The estimates most consistently point to a 6 to 7 percentage 
point increase in reporting rates of non-starter measures. The direct policy implications of my 
findings are unsurprising: hospitals responsiveness to a change in financial penalties depends on 
the level of the existing penalty and the magnitude of the change. In this case, a penalty of 0.4 
percent for the non-starter measures would likely have been sufficient to induce hospitals to 
publicly report their non-starter measure scores.  
Hospital Compare and Medicare Reimbursement 
The Hospital Compare quality initiative program began as joint venture between the 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) and the Hospital Quality Alliance (HQA) as 
a result of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act (MMA) of 
2003.14    
The Hospital Compare Program publishes condition-specific hospital quality scores from 
2005 onward15, and starting in 2008, patient evaluations of hospital cleanliness, promptness of 
service, and experience of stay. The data for the process score, a measure for whether a hospital 
14 The HQA is a national collaboration formed in 2002 between providers, consumers, and oversight agencies. The 
purpose of the HQA is to work towards providing information about health care providers to consumers. The CMS 
is a subsidiary of the Department of Health and Human Services and is the governmental agency responsible for the 
implementation of Medicare, Medicaid, the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) as well as other health-
based services. 15 The calculations of these scores are discussed more extensively in the data section. 
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provided condition and patient appropriate care for its admissions, and outcome score, a risk-
adjusted mortality rate for each condition and hospital, are collected published on the Hospital 
Compare website after a year of individual hospital data collection.  
Score reporting is optional for all hospitals in the sense that participation in the program 
is not legally required. However, the MMA established that hospitals that do not participate by 
reporting 10 “starter” quality measures would be financially penalized through their Medicare 
reimbursements. The 10 starter measures were a subset of the initial 19 available quality 
measures that measured hospital performance for treatment of heart attacks, pneumonia, and 
heart failure.16  
The financial penalty for non-reporting of the starter measures consisted of a reduction of 
0.4 percent of the hospital’s total Medicare reimbursement during the years 2005 through 2007. 
The Deficit Reduction Act (DRA) of 2005 increased both the penalty for non-reporting and the 
number of measures that a hospital was obligated to report in order to quality for full 
reimbursement. The number of process measures expanded to the full 21 measures found in 
Table 1, while the penalty for non-participation increased to 2.0 percent of the Medicare 
reimbursement rate.  
Medicare reimbursement rates are set by the CMS in advance of each procedure; 
procedures and conditions treated are assigned a reimbursement rate that is a function of resource 
use intensity, geographic location, and probability of malpractice. The patient’s reimbursement 
rate is dependent on the Diagnosis Related Group of the patient: upon admission, each patient 
16 The Surgical Care Improvement Project measures are not included in the analysis: these measures were 
simultaneously introduced and penalized for non-reporting in late 2007. The concurrent introduction of the penalty 
and the addition of the measures would not allow me to identify an effect of the change in penalty in 2007 on the 
probability of reporting these measures.  
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receives a diagnosis – reimbursement for the treatment of a patient’s diagnosis is subject to a 
specific, pre-set reimbursement rate set by Medicare.  
Additionally, a hospital receives a higher reimbursement rate if the government determines that it 
is:  
a) A “disproportionate share hospital,” which is a hospital that accepts a high share of low-
income (and presumably high cost to the hospital) patients.  
b) A teaching hospital. The costs of educating future and young physicians include both indirect 
and direct expenses. 
c) An “outlier” case. If a patient receives a high amount of medically necessary treatment that 
exceeds a certain cost threshold, Medicare will reimburse the provider more than the standard 
amount.   
Ultimately, hospital reimbursement for Medicare patient, i, with a diagnosis of d, takes the 
following form if a hospital, h, chooses to report its starter scores: 
𝑅𝑒𝑖𝑚𝑏𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖ℎ = ( 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒(𝑑)𝑖) ∗ (𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡ℎ). 
If the hospital declines to report the starter scores in the years 2005 through 2007, then: 
𝑅𝑒𝑖𝑚𝑏𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖ℎ = (𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒(𝑑)𝑖) ∗ (𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡ℎ) ∗ (0.996) 
Reimbursement after 2007, with the suppression of either starter scores or non-starter scores: 
𝑅𝑒𝑖𝑚𝑏𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖ℎ = (𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒(𝑑)𝑖) ∗ (𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡ℎ) ∗ (0.98) 
The decrease in reimbursement takes place for all hospitals except for Veteran’s 
Administration and critical access hospitals. Critical access hospitals are privy to their own 
reimbursement agreements with Medicare: critical access hospitals are reimbursed 101 percent 
of the cost of patient care instead of facing a fixed reimbursement rate per diagnosis. This paper 
focuses on critical access hospital score reporting as a control group because of the lack of a 
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change in financial penalty, but acknowledges that the different reimbursement scheme and 
attributes of critical access hospitals may insert doubt as to the suitability of the control group 
designation. 
Public quality scores are effective only if patients and physicians are aware of and believe 
the scores – an unknown scoring system that produces incredible scores is a waste of resources. 
To avoid the pitfall of obscurity, the CMS took steps to advertise the hospital compare scores in 
2007 by posting local hospital names and quality scores in area newspapers around the United 
States.  
Theoretical  
A hospital's decision to participate in Hospital Compare affects hospital revenue in three 
distinct ways. The first and most direct way is through an immediate drop in the hospital's 
Medicare reimbursement percentage if the hospital chooses to suppress its score. The second is 
through a hospital's future quantity of patients: if a hospital reveals a high (or particularly low) 
quality score, it is likely that the future flow of patients may change as a result of the score 
(Werner, 2012). The final way that hospital revenue is affected by the hospital's participation in 
Hospital Compare is that revelation of the score may affect the average patient illness severity 
(Jung, 2010).  
Basic economic theory hypothesizes that hospitals will reveal their scores if the net 
benefits exceed the costs of reporting. A change in the magnitude of the Medicare 
reimbursement percentage penalty of non-participation in Hospital Compare directly affects the 
cost of a non-participating hospital's decision, while leaving the benefits of revelation 
unchanged. An increase in the cost of non-participation in Hospital Compare may thus compel a 
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score-withholding hospital to participate in the program.  The Appendix contains thorough 
treatment of the estimated model. 
I use logistic and ordinary least squares regressions to estimate the effect of a change in 
the CMS penalty on hospital reporting behavior, including some specifications with lagged 
hospital demographic controls: patient severity and number, the hospital’s overall percentage of 
Medicare patients, teaching status, wage and capital information, public or private ownership, 
and the number of nearby hospitals.  
Data  
Quarterly score data are publicly available on the Hospital Compare website; I am able to 
determine for each measure and hospital whether a score is available. I consider that a hospital 
has reported all starter measures when all starter measures for the hospital are reported in the 
data.17 In later years, when the non-starter measure penalty is in effect, I require that a hospital 
report all 19 measures consistently available since 2005. The unit of analysis is hospital-quarter, 
using the years 2006 through 2009 (quarters 4 through 18 of the program). 
Hospital Compare scores are composed of quality scores by condition: acute myocardial 
infarction (heart attack), heart disease, pneumonia, and surgical infection prevention measures. 
These condition scores are, in turn, composed of measure scores and patient outcomes. Patient 
outcomes (risk adjusted mortality rates) receive 10 percent of the total quality score weight, 
while the remaining 90 percent of the score is calculated by averaging the condition measure 
17 A hospital’s measure score may not be reported if the hospital treats fewer than ten patients for the measure. 
These cases are documented in the data and I do not treat the measure for the hospital as non-reported when this 
occurs. I treat the scores as suppressed if measure scores are missing without further documentation. 
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scores. The specific measures vary by condition, but hospital performance on each measure 
receives equal weight when calculating the condition score. 
A quality score for a specific measure is calculated by determining the average hospital 
percentage of patients who receive appropriate care for the measure. A patient who is admitted 
with heart failure, for example, should be given an aspirin within 30 minutes of admission. If 70 
percent of the patients admitted to the hospital with heart disease receive aspirin when admitted, 
the hospital receives a quality score of 70 percent. Of course, patients who are physically 
ineligible for treatment do not count towards the score: if the patient with heart disease is allergic 
to aspirin, a hospital that withholds the medication would not be punished for recognizing 
appropriate care for the patient. 
National Provider Identifiers are standardized provider identification numbers used 
amongst private and public health insurance companies; the CMS created this system shortly 
before the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996 mandated a 
standard system of identifying providers. In the case of a hospital merger, the “surviving” 
institution retains its NPI, and in the case of a hospital closure, the NPI is deactivated. If a 
hospital restarts after a closure, the NPI is reactivated. I use the NPI in the CMS data to 
determine whether a hospital merges with another or closes during the period of interest. I 
determine the latitude and longitude of each hospital address in the year 2005 and calculate 
through 2009 the number of hospital neighbors.  
I am unable to determine the market share (not to mention the local market area) of a 
hospital, and thus am unable to compute a Herfindahl Index. Instead, I use the number of 
hospitals within fifteen miles of each individual hospital. The advantage to using distance instead 
of a Herfindahl index is that distance may proxy for a hospital’s local market area but does not 
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require definition of a total market area. That is, the Herfindahl index must take all hospital 
market shares into account (a fraction of patients out of the total patient population in the total 
market area).  
A total hospital market area is notoriously difficult to define; different market areas and 
patient populations may exist for different procedures, and it is entirely possible that hospitals 
may straddle market areas rather than exist completely within one market. This issue is discussed 
in greater detail in Chapter 20 of Handbook of Health Economics: The Industrial Organization of 
Health Care Markets (Dranove and Satterthwaite, 2000).  
While using the number of hospitals within a certain distance may seem arbitrary, the 
method avoids the problem of defining a hospital market area or population. The Dartmouth 
Atlas Project expands the idea of a Hospital Service Area by determining patient origin (United 
States Postal Service zip-code) from Medicare Inpatient files – each zip-code faces a plurality 
rule to which hospital it is assigned. The Dartmouth Atlas reports that the propensity of a local 
population to patronize a local hospital is high – more than 50% of the country lives in an area 
where 70% of the patient population relies on the local hospital.  
Additional Control variables: 
Percentage of disproportionate share patients:  
A hospital is designated as a “disproportionate share hospital” if the percentage of low-
reimbursement patients (Medicaid patients and Medicare patients who quality for supplemental 
security income) exceeds fifteen percent. When a hospital exceeds this fifteen percent threshold, 
it receives additional funds from Medicare for care provided its patients.   
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Medicare patient days to total days:  
Medicare patient days are defined as the percentage of total patient days in the hospital 
spent by Medicare patients. Ultimately, a hospital’s reimbursement rate from Medicare rests on 
whether it admits any Medicare patients. If a hospital does not admit Medicare patients, then a 
difference in the reimbursement rate should not affect the hospital’s reporting behavior. 
Operating and capital costs to Medicare covered charges ratio:  
This number is an indicator of how costly the operations (capital) of the hospital are – A 
number less than one indicates that the standard hospital operating costs for care are greater than 
the amount reimbursed by Medicare for care provided, while a number greater than one would 
indicate that the hospital is making a profit from operations. These variables act as proxies for 
different hospital operating environments; it is reasonable to assume that these variables will 
capture differences in hospital equipment and competence of staff. 
Hospital Ownership:  
There is discussion in the literature that the appropriate model for non-profit hospital 
operation is a utility function, rather than a profit function that is appropriate for proprietary 
hospitals. Research examining the difference between the two finds differences in resource 
allocation between hospitals of different ownership but similar behavior in terms of overall 
treatment of patients (Duggan, 2000). Nonetheless, I include a variable that indicates the 
hospital’s yearly ownership status, including those that switch from profit to non-profit during 
2005-2008.  
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Average daily census, number of beds, and total number of cases: 
These variables capture the difference in aptitude of taking care of a great deal of 
patients; size and number of patients seen may increase the proficiency with which hospitals treat 
patients. Conversely, it is possible that an overcrowding of patients may decrease the quality 
score of the hospital.  
Resident to bed ratio:  
As previously discussed, hospitals with teaching programs receive additional Medicare 
adjustments to the base prospective payment rate set by Medicare. The adjustments are meant to 
compensate for the “learning curve” of residents – diagnostics and equipment may be used at a 
greater rate than would be expected due to the learning environment of the hospital. Despite this, 
teaching hospitals are considered to be the forefront of the medical field and may perform better 
on the measure scores than would otherwise be expected. A control variable that captures the 
teaching status of the hospital accounts for fundamental environmental differences in the 
hospital.   
Table 2 presents summary statistics for acute-care hospitals. Table 3 presents the 
federally mandated requirements to be classified as a critical-access hospital. 
Estimation 
The reimbursement penalty changed from 0.4 percent to 2.0 percent in late 2007 for the ten 
starter measures in acute care hospitals. To determine the effect of this specific change in 
reimbursement penalty on the probability of reporting the ten starter measures, I conduct a 
difference-in-differences estimation using the starter measures that critical access hospitals report 
as a control group.  Conditioning on acute care hospitals, I estimate:  
54  
1) Pr(Report starter measures|Acute Care Hospital)it  =   α  +   Reimbursement Changet ∗
β +  Xit−1 B + γt + λi  + ϵit 
Equation 1 estimates the change in probability of acute care hospital participation in Hospital 
Compare as a function of the Medicare reimbursement penalty change, lagged hospital 
demographics, time-invariant hospital effects, and time effects.  
Critical access hospitals are not subject to a change in reimbursement and have mandated 
stationary characteristics to remain classified as a CAH, so for this specific type of hospital the 
estimating equation becomes:  
2) Pr(Report starter measures|Critical Access Hospital)it  = α + γt  + λ𝑖 + ϵit  
Equation 2 estimates the change in the probability of critical access hospital participation in 
Hospital Compare as a function of time-invariant hospital effects and time effects.  
When the two equations are combined, the final difference-in-differences estimating equation 
becomes: 
3)  Pr(Report starter measure) = α + Acute Carei ×  Reimbursement Changet ∗ β1 +Rembursement Changet ∗ β2 + Acute Carei ∗ β3 + Xit−1Β +  γt + λi + ϵit 
Equation 3 provides the estimate of interest, 𝛽1, the effect of the reimbursement change on acute-
care hospitals. Theoretically, 𝛽1is anticipated to be greater than or equal to zero: either the 
penalty has a positive effect on hospital reporting or it has zero effect.  
I am able to estimate the effect of a change in reimbursement on hospital reporting using 
both logistic and ordinary least squares regression techniques. Logistic regressions ensure that 
the predicted probabilities of reporting are between zero and one, and the ordinary least squares 
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(OLS) regressions include hospital level fixed effects.18 Logistic regressions assume a binomial 
error distribution, while the OLS errors are assumed to be normally distributed. All logistic 
marginal effects are manually calculated and standard errors are clustered at the hospital level. 
A more interesting question is the effect on reporting of the reimbursement penalty that 
changes from zero percent to 2 percent in 2007 for the non-starter measures. I anticipate that 
since most hospitals respond to the initial incentive of zero to 0.4 percent for the starter 
measures, a larger effect on reporting of the reimbursement penalty increase will be found for the 
non-starter measures. I can estimate the effect of the change in reimbursement for the non-starter 
measures by using as a control group the initial starter measures in acute care hospitals. By using 
the starter measure reporting rates as a control group, I avoid the concern that simple 
differencing may not control for unobservable time-varying hospital characteristics.   
I estimate the effect of a change in the penalty on non-starter measures by using as a control 
group the starter reporting rates of acute care hospitals. I estimate, similar to Equation 3: 
4)  Pr(Report) = α + (non − starter penalty enacted ×  non − starter measure) ∗ β1 +non − starter measure ∗ β2 + starter penalty enacted ∗ β3 + starter trend + Xit−1Β +
γt + λi + ϵit  
The coefficient of interest is 𝛽1, the effect of the interaction between the non-starter penalty 
enactment and the non-starter measures. 𝛽1 should be positive: a financial penalty enacted on 
non-starter penalties will have a positive effect on the reporting rate of non-starter measures. I 
include indicators for the different measures, a penalty indicator, and a reporting time trend for 
the different kind of penalties as well as lagged hospital demographic variables. 
18 Horrace and Oaxaca (2006) state that OLS estimates are unbiased and consistent if all predicted probabilities are bounded within the unit interval. Post-estimation, I verify that this condition holds,                                                              
56  
This technique eliminates the concern that unobserved hospital-level characteristics may bias 
the estimates, but introduces a possible downward bias to the estimates of the change in 
reimbursement. The starter measures are also subject to a change in reimbursement, but from 0.4 
percent to 2 percent, instead of zero to 2 percent. If regression estimates reveal that there is a 
change in reporting behavior as a result of the change in the non-starter penalty using the starter 
measures as a control, I may be subtracting a change in reporting behavior due to an increase in 
penalty for the starter measures:   
5) Pr(Report | non − starter measures) = α +  non − starter penalty enactedt ∗ β1 + XitB + γt + λi + ϵit 
6) Pr(Report |starter measures) = α +  starter penalty change enactedt ∗ β2  +  XitB +
γt + λi + ϵit  
If I assume that the effect of the starter reimbursement penalty change, 𝛽2, is equal to 0 (evidence 
supporting this is reported in Table 4), then the estimate of the non-starter reimbursement change 
is unbiased. However, if the starter reimbursement change has a positive effect on starter 
reporting, then:  
7) Pr(Report | non − starter) − Pr(Report | starter) =  Non − starter penalty enactedt ∗
β1   −  Starter penalty changet ∗ β2  <  Non − starter penalty enactedt ∗ β1 
Thus the estimates from the second difference-in-differences regression results are a lower bound 
estimate of the effect of penalty change in non-starter reimbursement.   
Results 
Effect of Penalty Change on Starter Measures 
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Presented in Table 4 are the estimates of the change in the reimbursement penalty on 
starter measures. I find that, in most cases, there is an extremely small, insignificant, and 
negative effect of the reimbursement penalty change on starter measure reporting.  
The logistic regression estimate in the first row of Column 1 in Table 4 shows a 
statistically insignificant and positive effect of the penalty increase on starter measure reporting 
rates of about 1.8 percentage points. Adding hospital covariates decreases the estimate to 
approximately 1.7 percentage points. The addition of hospital fixed effects in the ordinary least 
squares regressions in column 3 reduces the magnitude of the effect of the penalty change on 
starter measures to approximately a 0.2 percentage point effect. When I add covariates to the 
linear model with fixed effects, the coefficient rises to about 0.5 percentage points and remains 
insignificant. I conclude from these estimates that the effect of the change in penalty on starter 
measures is not statistically different from zero.19 
Effect of Penalty Change on Non-Starter Measures 
Table 5 reports the non-starter measure results from using starter measures as a control 
group.  The marginal effect of the change in the penalty on non-starter measures is reported in 
the first row. The logistic regressions (Columns 1 and 2) report an increase in reporting of about 
8.2 percentage points, and the fixed effects regressions (Columns 3 and 4) report estimates of a 
change in reporting rates of 4.5 percentage points.  
The OLS estimates, which add hospital-level fixed effects to the estimation, are 
approximately the same magnitude as the previous estimates. Without demographics, the OLS 
estimates that the effect of the penalty enactment is approximately a 4.5 percentage point change. 
19 Analysis is also conducted using a conditional logistic function: in this case, the marginal effect of the penalty on the starter measures is found to be a statistically insignificant and negative; the model predicts no marginal effects in the treatment group because the predicted probability of reporting is high, with slight movement in the critical access starter measure control group. 
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The addition of demographics does not affect the estimate of the penalty change. With a baseline 
in these estimates of about an 85 percent reporting rate, the magnitudes of the estimates in 
Columns 3 and 4 yield approximately 5 percent changes in the probability of reporting. The 
estimated effect on reporting of a change in penalty of the non-starter measures is much larger in 
magnitude than the estimates of the effect on reporting of a change in penalty effect for the 
starter measures.  
Robustness 
Pre-trends:   
I also test for pre-policy trends in both the starter difference-in-differences equations and 
the two non-starter difference-in-differences equations. To test for different time trends in the 
analysis, I only use the pre-treatment data, (all quarters available during the year 2006 and most 
of the year 2007), and implement a placebo penalty on the treated variables. The placebo penalty 
analysis assumes that the penalty began in the beginning of 2006. 
Results for the pre-trend analysis are reported in Table 6: I find insignificant and mixed-
sign results for the starter measures that use critical-access hospitals as a control group. Figure 1 
further illustrates the absence of a pre-trend by in the starter measure difference-in-differences 
equations by plotting the starter measure reporting rates for both types of hospitals across time. 
The logistic regressions that do not assume an individual provider trend through time yield 
negative results, while the inclusion of fixed effects yields a significant result of about 1.5 
percentage points. The insignificant but positive results possibly point to a different trend that 
could lead to an underestimate of the true effect of the change in policy. 
Table 7 reports pre-trend estimates that indicate significantly different positive reporting 
trends exist for the non-starter measures. Columns 1 and 2, which report logistic regression 
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marginal effects, show a large difference in the reporting trends between types of measures. 
After the addition of fixed effects in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 7, the placebo policy shows that 
reporting rates for non-starter measures increase by 2 percentage points in response to the 
“policy.” It is likely that since most hospitals already fully reported the starter measures, the 
lower baseline for the non-starter measures allowed for an upward trend. These results reveal 
what was already suspected: non-starter measures may be subject to different trends than the 
starter measures; thus, the original estimated effect of the penalty change on reporting could be 
an underestimate of the true effect. To illustrate these trends, I provide a graph of the reporting 
trends for non-starter and starter measures in Figure 2. 
Marginal Effects of a Reimbursement Penalty Increase: 
I discussed in previous sections the fact that the estimate of the change in the penalty on 
the non-starter measures may an underestimate of the change in reporting. Another way of 
determining the marginal effect of a change in the penalty rates is to directly estimate the effect 
of penalty percentage rates. 
I estimate the following equation:  
8) P r(Report) = α +  Reimbursement Penalty ∗ β1 + (Reimbursement Penalty)2 ∗ β2 +(non − starter) ∗ β3 + (non − starter ×  t) ∗  β4  + X𝑖𝑡 Β + γ𝑡 + λ𝑖 + ϵ𝑖𝑡  
The penalty rates are included in the equation as a quadratic function to capture the non-linearity 
of reporting behavior as a function of the penalty change. I use the same hospital demographic 
estimates included previously in the regressions and as well as time and provider fixed effects.  
 The effect of a percent change in penalty rate is found in Table 8. My estimates of the 
effect of a penalty increase from 0 to 1 percent imply an increase in the probability of reporting 
by approximately 11 percentage points (Columns 1 and 2), which becomes 8 percentage points 
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with the inclusion of fixed effects (Columns 3 and 4). Using estimates in Column 4, I calculate 
that the penalty increase on the voluntary measures has approximately a 6.5 percentage point 
effect on the probability of reporting, and the penalty increase (from 0.4 percent to 2 percent) 
affects hospital reporting by approximately 2 percentage points. From a baseline of 75 percent 
reporting rates, the change in penalty from 0 percent to 2 percent increased the reporting rates of 
non-starter measures by approximately 8.5 percent, and a penalty increase from 0.4 percent to 2 
percent raised reporting rates of starter measures by 2.5 percent.20 
To determine whether these results are robust to the inclusion of critical-access starter 
measures, which do not encounter a reimbursement penalty for non-reporting, I estimate: 
9) P r(Report) = α +  Reimbursement Penalty ∗ β1 + (Reimbursement Penalty)2 ∗ β2 +(non − starter) ∗ β3 + (non − starter ×  t) ∗  β4  + Acute Care ∗ β5 + X𝑖𝑡 Β + γ𝑡 + λ𝑖 +
ϵ𝑖𝑡 
Table 9 reports that the addition of the critical-access starter measures are similar to the original 
regression that includes only the acute care starter and non-starter measure reporting rates. An 
increase in penalty from 0 percent to 1 percent increases reporting rates by approximately 13 
percent in the logistic regressions, while the OLS fixed effect regressions report a reporting  
increase of about 10 percentage points when the penalty increases from 0 to 1 percent. I calculate 
using Column 4 that an increase in the penalty from 0 to 2 percent raises the probability of 
reporting by 7.5 percentage points, an increase of about 8 percent, while the estimate of the 
increase from 0.4 percent to 2 percent remained at 2 percentage points (an increase of slightly 
larger than 2 percent).  
20 The marginal change in reporting rates is manually calculated: i.e. a change in reporting rates when the penalty 
moves from 0.4 percent to 2 percent is calculated (from Column 4 in Table 8): (.132*2-.0495*4)-(.132*.4-
.0495*.16) = .021. 
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Discussion 
Current research indicates that an increase in Medicare reimbursement leads to an 
increase in private insurance reimbursement, as private insurers must compensate hospitals for 
the change in relative financial attractiveness of private enrollees (Nicholson, American Society 
of Health Economists Conference presentation, 2012). However, in my analysis, if a hospital 
chooses not to report a measure, this is a hospital-level decision in response to federal 
reimbursement, rather than an exogenous change in federal reimbursement. I have not found any 
research or evidence suggesting that private insurers made reimbursement changes based on 
hospital quality scores or hospital reporting decisions: this is an avenue for future research. As 
this paper stands, the theoretical model relies on the assumption that the reimbursement rates that 
a hospital receives for treating privately insured individuals remain unaffected by the change in 
the CMS penalty. 
It is possible that the number of nearby hospitals is endogenous to a hospital’s quality. 
However, the analysis is robust to the exclusion of the competition measure in the regressions. 
The robustness of the estimates raises the natural question of whether the Hospital Compare 
quality measures accurately capture a hospital’s actual quality, or instead, provide a metric on 
which performance may be easily manipulated by a hospital to appear of a higher quality than it 
is. The latter situation seems most probable, as the measures generally tend to include low-cost 
interventions, both in terms of the hospital’s cost of care for the patient, and insurance payouts 
(public and private). An area with research potential is that which analyzes the content of 
Hospital Compare scores and their impacts on consumer, hospital, and insurer behavior. The 
inclusion of post-2008 measures may help to address this question in later work. 
62   The importance of this paper lies in the implications for the implementation of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) of 2010. Public quality score schemes for full Medicare reimbursement are currently mandated for hospitals and nursing homes. Starting in 2014, physician reimbursement rates will also be affected by both the presence and content of quality scores. Without the reimbursement penalty, providers would likely not participate fully in their quality programs and instead would report the metrics that shed the most favorable light on the provider.  This research shows that these financial incentives play a crucial role in providing relevant information to both patients and providers.  
 Conclusion 
The Hospital Compare data is potentially an important tool for the assessment of hospital 
performance on standardized, clinically appropriate, measures of hospital quality. However, 
before researchers can attempt to analyze the data, the issue of hospital selection into the 
program must first be addressed.  
This paper specifically determines the effect of a changed financial penalty on hospital 
selection into Hospital Compare. The financial penalty varies by measure, which is an important 
source of variation for the analysis. For the ten “starter” measures, I find that the change in 2007 
in the penalty for non-reporting had little effect: my top estimate of an increase of  2 percent in 
reporting rates is small compared to my estimates of 7.5 percentage point increases in reporting 
rates due to the penalty change from 0 to 2 percent. Non-starter measures were more responsive 
to the change in penalty, revealing that hospitals likely respond non-linearly to changes in 
penalties for reporting: my lowest estimate for a change in reporting is about a 5 percent change, 
with a top estimate of approximately 8 percent.  
My results suggest that the presence of any penalty for non-reporting is more important 
than an increase in a penalty for non-reporting. However, the increase in the penalty provides 
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more federal revenue from the non-reporters. A primary assumption of my model is that the cost 
of collecting and reporting data is low; if this assumption is incorrect, it may be possible that 
non-reporting hospitals are already in financial distress and are unable to organize their resources 
in a way that would allow participation in Hospital Compare. More research is needed to 
investigate other reasons for Hospital Compare participation. 
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Table 2.1: Hospital Compare Quality Measures 
Condition  Measure Starter Measure 
   
Heart Attack (Acute 
Myocardial Infarction)  
• Aspirin at arrival Yes 
• Aspirin prescribed at discharge Yes 
• ACE inhibitor (ACE–I) or Angiotensin Receptor 
      
 
Yes 
• Beta blocker at arrival Yes 
• Beta blocker prescribed at discharge Yes 
• Thrombolytic agent received within 30 minutes 
    
 
• Percutaneous Coronary Intervention (PCI) 
        
 
• Adult smoking cessation advice/counseling  
   
Heart Failure (HF) 
• Left ventricular function assessment Yes 
• ACE inhibitor (ACE–I) or Angiotensin Receptor 
      
 
Yes 
• Discharge instructions  
• Adult smoking cessation advice/counseling  
   
Pneumonia (PNE) 
• Initial antibiotic received within 4 hours of 
  
Yes 
• Oxygenation assessment Yes 
• Pneumococcal vaccination status Yes 
• Blood culture performed before first antibiotic 
   
 
• Adult smoking cessation advice/counseling  
• Appropriate initial antibiotic selection  
• Influenza vaccination status  
   
Surgical Care Improvement 
Project (Omitted from 
 
• Prophylactic antibiotic received within 1 hour 
    
 
• Prophylactic antibiotics discontinued within 24 
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics for Acute Care Hospitals and Critical Access Hospitals 
  Summary Statistics, Acute Care Hospitals 
 Before Penalty Change After Penalty Change 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
      
Report All Starter Measures 0.93 0.25 0.92 0.27 
Report All Non-Starter Measures 0.85 0.36 0.93 0.26 
Operating Cost to Charge Ratio 0.39 0.17 0.37 0.16 
Capital Cost to Charge Ratio 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Resident to Bed Ratio 0.06 0.15 0.06 0.15 
Percentage Medicare Patients 0.47 0.17 0.48 0.17 
Number of Cases 3256 3151 3208 3129 
Number of Beds 178 165 181 168 
Average Daily Census 111 126 113 129 
Case Mix Index 1.33 0.33 1.35 0.33 
Disproportionate Patient Percentage 0.26 0.18 0.26 0.18 
Number of Neighbors within 15 miles 3.54 2.13 3.57 2.12 
     
     
  Reporting Means, Critical Access Hospitals 
 Before Penalty Change After Penalty Change 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
          
67  
Report All Starter Measures 0.69 0.46 0.66 0.47 
Report All Non-Starter Measures 0.59 0.49 0.59 0.49 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.3: Critical Access Hospital Mandated Characteristics 
 
Federally Mandated Critical Access Hospital Eligibility Requirements 
Beds:  No more than 25 Beds 
Length of Stay: 
No more than 96 hours (4 days) average 
length of stay. 
Medicare: Must be a participant 
Owner: Not-for-profit 
Location:  
At least 35 miles from another hospital, 15 for 
mountainous areas. 
24 Hour Services:  Must make available 
Hospital System: 
Must participate in a rural health network, 
with at least one acute-care hospital 
Credentials: 
Must review staff and quality within the 
network 
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Figure 2.1: Starter Measure Reporting Rates 
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Figure 2.2: Mean Reporting Rates for Starter and Non-Starter Measures, Acute Care Hospitals 
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Table 2.4: Difference-in-Differences Estimates of the Reimbursement Penalty Change on 
Starter Measures 
 
 Logistic Regressions Linear Fixed Effect Regressions 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
Probability of 
Full Reporting 
Probability of 
Full Reporting 
Probability of Full 
Reporting 
Probability of 
Full Reporting 
          
Acute Care X Penalty Increase 0.0181 0.0169 0.00242 0.00479 
 (0.0268) (0.0355) (0.0081) (0.0081) 
Penalty Increase -0.0213 -0.0232 0.0206** 0.0215** 
 (0.0071) (0.0103) (0.0099) (0.0100) 
Acute Care Hospital  0.2416*** 0.2426*** - - 
 (0.0518) (0.0471)   
Acute Care Hospital X Time - - -5.26E-05 -0.000715 
   (0.0010) (0.0011) 
Constant - - 0.860*** 0.740*** 
   (0.0027) (0.0369) 
     
Observations 63,109 63,109 63,109 63,109 
R-squared   0.822 0.822 
Demographics No Yes No Yes 
Provider Effects No No Yes Yes 
Quarter Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Columns 1-2: Marginal effects reported, bootstrapped method standard errors in parentheses 
Columns 3-4: Clustered Standard Errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 2.5: Difference-in-Differences Estimates of the Effect of Non-Starter Penalty Enactment 
Using Acute Care Starter Measures as Control Group 
  Logistic Regressions Linear Fixed Effect Regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
Probability 
of Full 
Reporting 
Probability 
of Full 
Reporting 
Probability of 
Full Reporting 
Probability of 
Full Reporting 
          
Non-Starter Measure X Penalty Increase 0.0815*** 0.0835*** 0.0447*** 0.0447*** 
 (0.0095) (0.0114) (0.0029) (0.0029) 
Non-Starter Measure -0.0219*** -0.0219*** -0.125*** -0.125*** 
 (0.0035) (0.0041) (0.0035) (0.0035) 
Penalty Increase 0.0267*** 0.0275*** 0.0187*** 0.0206*** 
 (0.0064) (0.0071) (0.0030) (0.0036) 
Non-Starter Measure X Time - - 0.00620*** 0.00620*** 
   (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Constant - - 0.900*** 0.815*** 
   (0.0026) (0.0234) 
     
Observations 102,144 102,144 102,144 102,144 
R-squared   0.729 0.73 
Demographics No Yes No Yes 
Provider Effects No No Yes Yes 
Quarter Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Columns 1-2: Bootstrapped method standard errors in parentheses   
Columns 3-4: Clustered Standard Errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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Table 2.6: Starter Measure Pre-Trend Robustness Checks 
  Logistic Regressions Linear Fixed Effect Regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
Probability of 
Full 
Reporting 
Probability of 
Full 
Reporting 
Probability of 
Full Reporting 
Probability of 
Full Reporting 
          
Acute Care X Placebo Penalty 
Increase 
-0.0425 -0.0444 0.0175 0.0159 
 (0.0546) (0.0543) (0.0127) (0.0128) 
Placebo Penalty Increase - - 0.0813*** 0.0809*** 
   (0.0122) (0.0122) 
Acute Care Hospital  - - - - 
     
Acute Care Hospital X Time - - -0.0164*** -0.0164*** 
   (0.0041) (0.0041) 
Constant - - 0.924*** 0.846*** 
   (0.0129) (0.0367) 
     
Observations 24,726 24,726 24,726 24,726 
R-squared   0.894 0.894 
Demographics No Yes No Yes 
Provider Effects No No Yes Yes 
Quarter Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Columns 1-2: Bootstrapped method 
standard errors in parentheses 
        
Columns 3-4: Clustered Standard Errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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Table 2.7: Non-Starter Pre-Trend Robustness Checks 
 
  Logistic Regressions Linear Fixed Effect Regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Probability of 
Full Reporting 
Probability of 
Full Reporting 
Probability of 
Full Reporting 
Probability of 
Full Reporting 
          
Non-Starter Measure X Placebo 
Penalty Increase 0.0916*** 0.0909*** 0.0207*** 0.0207*** 
 (0.0126) (0.0175) (0.0077) (0.0077) 
Placebo Penalty Increase - - -0.239*** -0.239*** 
   (0.0118) (0.0118) 
Non-Starter Measure - - 0.0129*** 0.00939*** 
   (0.0033) (0.0034) 
Non-Starter Measure X Time - - 0.0222*** 0.0222*** 
   (0.0022) (0.0022) 
Constant - - 0.927*** 0.832*** 
   (0.0024) (0.0520) 
     
Observations 41,172 41,172 41,172 41,172 
R-squared   0.69 0.69 
Demographics No Yes No Yes 
Provider Effects No No Yes Yes 
Quarter Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Columns 1-2: Bootstrapped method standard errors in parentheses   
Columns 3-4: Clustered Standard Errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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Table 2.8: Calculating the marginal effects of penalty increases, Acute Care Hospitals 
 Logistic Regressions Linear Fixed Effect Regressions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Probability of 
Full Reporting 
Probability of 
Full Reporting 
Probability of 
Full Reporting 
Probability of 
Full Reporting 
     
Reimbursement Penalty 0.1123*** 0.1102*** 0.133*** 0.132*** 
 (0.0076) (0.0074) (0.0078) (0.0086) 
(Reimbursement Penalty)2 - - -0.0520*** -0.0495*** 
   (0.0034) (0.0038) 
Non-Starter Measure - - -0.0798*** -0.0798*** 
   (0.0048) (0.0051) 
Non-Starter Measure X Time - - 0.00620*** 0.00620*** 
   (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Constant - - 0.860*** 0.749*** 
   -0.00532 -0.0154 
     
Quadratic? No  No Yes Yes 
Demographics No  Yes No Yes 
Provider Fixed Effects No  No Yes Yes 
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 102,144 102,144 102,144 102,144 
R-squared 0.0255 0.3756 0.018 0.73 
Columns 1-2: Delta method standard errors in parentheses   
Columns 3-4: Clustered Standard Errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1        
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Table 2.9: Calculating the marginal effects of penalty increases, Acute Care and Critical 
Access Hospitals 
  Logistic Regressions Linear Fixed Effect Regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Probability of 
Full Reporting 
Probability of 
Full Reporting 
Probability of 
Full Reporting 
Probability of 
Full Reporting 
     
Reimbursement Penalty 0.2416*** 0.1344*** 0.167*** 0.165*** 
 (0.0107) (0.0113) (0.0092) (0.0088) 
(Reimbursement Penalty)2 - - -0.0664*** -0.0637*** 
   (0.0040) (0.0038) 
Acute Care Hospital  - - 0.260*** - 
   (0.0158)  
Non-Starter Measure - - -0.0584*** -0.0592*** 
   (0.0052) (0.0051) 
Non-Starter Measure X 
Time 
- - 0.00467*** 0.00473*** 
   (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Constant - - 0.592*** 1.046*** 
   (0.0151) (0.1260) 
     
Quadratic No No Yes Yes 
Demographics  No Yes No Yes 
Provider Effects No  No Yes Yes 
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 106,284 106,284 106,284 106,284 
R-squared     0.056 0.736 
Columns 1-2: Delta method standard errors in parentheses   
Columns 3-4: Clustered Standard Errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
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Appendix 2.1 
  
I develop a simple model to determine how a change in reimbursement rates will effect a 
hospital’s reporting decision. I use a hospital profit function to express an individual hospital’s 
profit at time t: 
1)  Π𝑡(𝑅) = 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑡 (𝑆𝑡,𝑁𝑡,𝑅𝑡−1,𝑄𝑡−1) –  𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡(𝑆𝑡,𝑁𝑡,𝑋𝑡)           
Revenue is affected directly by the CMS penalty for non-reporting and the quality score that it 
reports, if the hospital chooses to report at all. The financial penalty is expressed as a percentage 
of the standard Medicare reimbursement and only affects the hospital’s Medicare 
reimbursements.  
The severity of patient illness during time t, 𝑆𝑡, affects the amount of reimbursement 
from insurance companies but also increases hospital cost of care. 𝑁𝑡 is the hospital’s total 
number of admissions in time t. Total hospital costs are a function of the number and illness 
severity of patients, and include the operating costs of the hospital (wages and capital). 𝑅𝑡 is a 
dummy for public score reporting. I assume that in small spans of time, quality changes are zero: 
𝛿𝑄
𝛿𝑡
= 0. With this assumption, I can fix the hospital quality 𝑄𝑡 to 𝑄∗, at least locally. From this, 
we can say that 𝑄𝑡−1 = 𝑄𝑡 = 𝑄∗. 
Further, hospital patient case mix index and aggregate number of patients are affected by 
the hospital’s quality and whether the hospital reports this quality. Both the decision to report 
and the actual score reported sends a signal to patients – patients may interpret a missing score as 
a signal of poor hospital quality, and may seek admission to a different hospital for procedures. 
2)   𝑆𝑡 = 𝑆𝑡(𝑄𝑡−1,𝑅𝑡−1)   
3)   𝑁𝑡 = 𝑁𝑡(𝑄𝑡−1,𝑅𝑡−1)       
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From above, one can make the assumption that the changes in patient severity and number in a 
short period of time rest on the hospital’s fixed quality and whether the hospital chooses to report 
its scores. 
2a)   𝑆𝑡 = 𝑆𝑡(𝑄𝑡−1,𝑅𝑡−1) =  𝑆𝑡(𝑄𝑡,𝑅𝑡−1) = 𝑆𝑡(𝑄∗,𝑅𝑡−1)       
3a)  𝑁𝑡 = 𝑁(𝑄𝑡−1,𝑅𝑡−1) = 𝑁𝑡(𝑄𝑡,𝑅𝑡−1) = 𝑁𝑡(𝑄∗,𝑅𝑡−1)     
Under the assumption that hospitals are profit-maximizers (and thus rational), hospitals choose to 
publicly report their scores at time t if:  
4)   𝐸(Π𝑡+1| 𝑅𝑡 = 1) ≥ 𝐸(Π𝑡+1| 𝑅𝑡 = 0).                     
I remove expectations in the model and make the explicit assumption that 𝐸𝑡[𝜋𝑡+1 (𝑅𝑡)] =
𝜋𝑡+1(𝑅𝑡), and embed  𝑄∗ into the profit function, leaving only the dummy report variable, R. To 
save space, I change the notation so that 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑡+1�𝑆𝑡+1(𝑅𝑡 = 1)� =
𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑡+1�𝑆(1)�.  Using this shortened notation, the hospital decision to report becomes:   
5)
 Π𝑡+1(1)  = 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑡+1(𝑆(1),𝑁(1), 1)–  𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡+1�𝑆(1),𝑁(1),𝑋(1)� ≥      𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑡+1(𝑆(0),𝑁(0), 0) −  𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡+1�𝐶𝑀𝐼(0),𝑁(0),𝑋(0)� =  Π𝑡+1(0)     
Further simplifying, I obtain the following inequality:  
5a) 
𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑡+1(𝑆𝑡(1),𝑁𝑡(1), 1) − 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑡+1(𝑆𝑡(0),𝑁𝑡(0), 0) ≥ 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡+1�𝑆𝑡(1),𝑁𝑡(1),𝑋𝑡(1)�–  𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡+1�𝑆𝑡(0),𝑁𝑡(0),𝑋𝑡(0)�   
The above inequality shows the familiar condition that the hospital will publicly reveal its score 
if the increased revenue from doing so offsets its cost of care. The change cost of care is a 
function of the changes in patient illness severity and the number of patients from the reporting 
decision. 
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In this model, reporting information publicly can affect hospital profit in three ways: through 
a change in illness severity, through a change in hospital volume of patients, and through the 
Medicare reimbursement penalty. 
1) Through a change in illness severity. Empirically, patients and referring physicians tend 
to select different health care providers when hospital quality is revealed. Recent 
literature has explored the implications of hospital choice when quality is known: Jung et 
al. (2011) use a conditional logit model to explore the hospital choices of non-
hospitalized and recently hospitalized employees of a firm with the same health plan. 
Hospital quality in this framework plays a small role in where patients choose to receive 
health care. In contrast, Dranove et al. (2003) examine the effect of the mandatory 
hospital report cards for coronary artery bypass graft surgery (CABG) implemented in the 
early 1990s in New York State and Pennsylvania on the number of admissions and 
average patient severity in each hospital. Examining both provider-level and patient-level 
data, they find that patients of greater illness severity and in the most need of CABG 
surgery select into hospitals of greater quality (as measured by the CABG scores and 
teaching status), while healthier patients receive more surgery, presumably to boost the 
hospital’s score. While Dranove et al. (2003) do not conclude that report cards are 
harmful, in general, but rather the authors encourage reporting measures that minimize 
provider incentive for selection. Perhaps not coincidentally, the CMS passed the Hospital 
Compare program in 2003, and was set into action in 2005.  
 
2) Through a change in the number of patients. Previous empirical research dating from the 
1990s suggests that not only does average severity of patient illness change after quality 
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is revealed by a hospital but also that sicker patients are reluctant to patronize hospitals 
that may have a lower quality. Mukamel and Mushlin (1998) analyze the change in 
market share due to the public release in New York State of the CABG mortality rate 
report cards. Using OLS, they find that both surgeons and hospitals with an increase in 
mortality rates experience a subsequent decrease in market share (percentage of surgeries 
in the state). Cutler et. al. (2004), using the provider as the level of observation, find that 
not only do sicker patients tend to select into different hospitals based on the whether a 
hospital is flagged as “high mortality” but that the number of overall admissions is driven 
by the selection of the severely ill into different hospitals. More recently, Pope (2011) 
measures the impact of the US News and World Reports hospital rankings on the number 
of non-emergency admissions and specialty admissions of hospitals ranked in the 
magazine. He finds that a change in ranking, while controlling for the quality score on a 
scale of 1-100 is associated with a 1% increase in hospital revenue and estimates that 
more than 750 million dollars have changed hands due to the USNWR rankings.   
 
3) The most obvious way that a hospital is affected by public reporting is the immediate 
drop in Medicare reimbursement for the year if the hospital chooses not to report. As 
previously discussed, the CMS makes public a prospective payment schedule for the 
reimbursement of each illness treated in the beginning of each fiscal year: if the hospital 
chooses not to report its score, this reimbursement for patient treatment is dropped by a 
small percent. If a hospital chooses not to report its score in 2005, Medicare patient 
revenues are deducted by 0.4 percent (the annual inflation adjustment). Put another way: 
if a hospital treated a patient in 2005 and Medicare normally reimbursed a dollar for that 
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treatment, the hospital would receive 99.6 percent of the standard reimbursement rate if it 
had chosen not to report.  
 
Under the assumptions of the model, an increase in the CMS penalty does not directly affect 
the flow of patients. It increases instead the price that the hospital must pay to the CMS to keep 
the hospital’s quality information private, while expected patient changes as a result of reporting 
remain the same. It is likely that hospitals on the margin of reporting before the CMS penalty 
increase goes into effect are provided enough financial incentive to publicly report their scores. 
A plausible reason for a hospital to consider that its patient flow may be altered as a result of 
score reporting is the local presence of alternative health care providers. Empirical research 
suggests that patients choose their health care provider not only based on the observed and 
unobserved characteristics of care, but also on the distance or time spent traveling to receive the 
care. A change in the number of providers within a certain distance or traveling time from each 
hospital would affect a hospital’s expected patient revenue, all else equal.           
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Chapter 3:  The Effect of Mandated Health Insurance on Physician 
Reimbursement: Evidence from the Massachusetts Health Reform                             
82  
Introduction  
Massachusetts passed a health care reform in 2006 which was designed to expand insurance 
coverage to those without employer-provided health insurance and to offer catastrophic health 
insurance coverage for the entirety of its citizenry. The state required that insurance companies 
adopt a community-rating pricing schedule to guarantee that individuals were not priced out of 
affordable care, and a mandate required individuals to purchase health insurance to curb adverse 
selection and in doing so keep down costs. The state of Massachusetts also subsidized, to varying 
extents, the purchase of health insurance for individuals with incomes lower than 300 percent of 
the poverty line. This study analyzes the effects of the reform on the cost of health care by 
examining changes in physician reimbursement for three types of health care services for which 
health insurance coverage was mandated. 
 Estimates of the expansion of health coverage as a result of the reform range from 
approximately a 5 percentage point to almost a 10 percentage point increase in the number of 
covered individuals (Kolstad and Kowalski, 2010; Health Connector, 2012). Massachusetts 
initially underestimated the number of uninsured that would be affected by the program: 600,000 
consumers enrolled in health insurance when the mandate took effect instead of the projected 
400,000. It is likely that the surge of newly insured individuals into the health insurance market 
had an effect on fees for health services, as well as quality and access to care.21  
21 Masi and Long (2009) document an increase in access to care in Massachusetts during the years 2006 through 
2008 using Current Population Survey data. They find an increase of approximately 7 percentage points, from 86.4 
percent, in individuals reporting that they have a usual source of care, and about a 4 percentage point decrease, from 
25.4 percent, in the number of individuals who reported that they did not receive care in the past year. However, it 
was also much more likely that physician’s offices were not accepting new patients, a finding that matches reports 
from the Massachusetts Medical Society (2009). 
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 In Massachusetts, the price of health care services may have changed as a result of the 
influx of newly insured. Consumers become less sensitive to the price of a service when they are 
not responsible for its full payment, as in the case of health insurance (Manning et. al 1987).  
This price insensitivity can lead to overconsumption, increasing the equilibrium price of 
common procedures. It is also possible that the newly insured in the market are less likely to get 
sick and have little to no history of health complications, implying that the most ill patients 
selected into health insurance pre-reform. In this case of pre-reform adverse selection, the influx 
of healthier patients could lower the average cost of care and thus lower the equilibrium price of 
common procedures. These countervailing forces leave us without a clear prediction of the 
direction of the equilibrium price of care as a result of the health insurance mandate.   
 We use a large data set of health insurance claims to private insurers to estimate the 
impact of the Massachusetts Health Insurance Reform on physician reimbursement for well-
infant, well-adult, and appendectomy visits.22  Estimates are obtained using a difference-in-
differences strategy which compares Massachusetts to similar nearby states. We focus on well-
infant, well-adult, and appendectomy visits for their representativeness of newly covered 
services under the mandate which have different price elasticities of demand. 
Well-infant visits are the most price-elastic of the services: parents may balk at the cost 
of a medical checkup for infants who seem healthy.23 Empirically, uninsured children receive 
22 Data Source: FAIR Health, Inc., an independent, New York nonprofit corporation. 
23  A simple internet search for “Are infant well-care visits necessary?” leads to numerous parent forums debating 
the necessity of post-infant immunization well-infant visits, anecdotally indicating a high price elasticity of demand 
for infant well-care visits. The American Academy of Pediatrics recommends 6 well-infant visits during the first 
year of life: the average insurance-negotiated price of one of these visits is approximately 100 dollars. Most children 
receive some of the recommended visits, but on average, do not receive all six exams.  
                                                             
84  
fewer than half of the recommended number of well-care visits in their first year,24 and 
economics research indicates that health insurance expansions to low income individuals 
increases the utilization of child preventative care (Currie and Gruber, 1996; De La Mata, 2012). 
Appendectomies are an emergency procedure with a low price elasticity of demand: failure to get 
an appendectomy when it is needed can result in severe infection and possibly death if the 
appendix bursts. Well adult visits are somewhere in between, neither as inelastic as 
appendectomies nor as elastic as well-child visits. 
 A more intuitive way to think of the impact of the Massachusetts Health Insurance 
Reform on prices is to think of the newly insured as shifting the demand curve for health services 
to the right (outward), thus driving the equilibrium price upward. Different procedures will 
experience different degrees of increased demand due to an increase in the newly insured. The 
amount of increased demand is a result of the post-insurance consumer price (both financial and 
physical) of each procedure.  
Of the three services that we choose, well-child visits will experience the greatest 
increase in demand because the net benefit of receiving the procedure is the highest, as well-
child visits become low-cost both financially and physically after insurance. Well-adult physicals 
will experience a lesser increase in demand, primarily because the most ill patients already 
receive adult check-ups. The less-ill, newly-insured adult patients will drive an increase in 
demand for well-adult visits. Appendectomies are one-time emergency procedures necessitated 
by the emergence of acute appendicitis. Because these procedures are conducted in the case of a 
medical emergency, the demand for appendectomies will not be affected by patient changes in 
24 Estimates from the National Survey of Early Childhood Health show that of the American Academy of Pediatrics 
recommended 6 well-care visits in the first year, privately insured children receive over 4 visits in their first year of 
life, while uninsured children receive fewer than 3. The National Survey of Early Childhood Health data is made 
available by the Centers for Disease Control (www.cdc.gov). 
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insurance status. Estimates show that infant well-care reimbursement rises 4 percent while the 
reform is being implemented, but the increases are not persistent.  Reimbursements for adult 
well-care and appendectomy are unaffected by the mandate. The estimates can be further refined 
by adding in a third difference between well visits (which likely had a large post-reform patient 
influx) and appendectomies (which likely did not).  The impact of the mandate on 
reimbursements for well-infant visits during the implementation period is smaller in magnitude. 
Passed in 2010, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) is primarily 
based on the Massachusetts Health Insurance reform model, including an individual insurance 
mandate. The PPACA is designed to simultaneously expand health insurance coverage while 
controlling government spending on health services. To our knowledge, this is the first study to 
analyze the price effects of a health insurance mandate, which may drastically impact current and 
future public policy cost-benefit analyses.  
The Massachusetts Health Insurance Reform 
In 2006, the state of Massachusetts passed “An Act Providing Access to Affordable, Quality, 
Accountable Health Care,” which mandated individual health insurance coverage by mid-2007.  
The reform was designed to create a larger pool of insured though an insurance mandate to 
reduce adverse selection. The law requires individuals to purchase health insurance or 
alternatively to pay a fine for lack of coverage. Most employer-provided health insurance 
coverage was unaffected by the reform. By eliminating selection into health insurance, the 
intention was to reduce total state spending on health care as well as to ensure near-universal 
health insurance coverage (Gruber, 2008).  
Under the law, individuals are required to purchase insurance that qualifies for minimum 
creditable coverage or face a fine for non-compliance. Minimum creditable coverage includes 
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basic preventative, diagnostic, and emergency care. Appendix 1 details the specific coverage 
areas required to qualify as insured in Massachusetts after 2006. Partial or full subsidies for low-
income adults and children were provided in January 2007 to ensure that the most financially 
needy individuals would be in compliance.25 
Since 2007, over 400,000 people have entered the Massachusetts insurance pool. Over 98% 
of the state population is now insured (Courtemanche and Zapata, 2012).  This mass enrollment 
in health insurance applied a shock to the health care market: a sizeable portion of the patient 
population gained insurance coverage and became far more price inelastic with the coverage.26  
In addition, recent work by Kolstad, Hackmann, and Kowalski (2012) indicates that the majority 
of the newly insured required less care and were likely healthier than those who purchased 
insurance before the mandate, as indicated by lower average hospital costs per capita after the 
mandate.  The average patient seeking care in Massachusetts became healthier as new 
individuals entered the market, which drove the average cost of health services downward.  The 
mandate’s impact on the price elasticity of demand for health care (which exerted upward 
pressure on prices) was counteracted by the downward pressure on price for health services from 
the expansion of the insurance pool. 
Theoretical Considerations 
A simple model follows to illustrate how the increase in the insured population would 
influence the equilibrium price of health care. Consider a health care economy with two types of 
potential patients: healthy patients who have a low propensity to need medical services and sick 
25 Families who qualified for MassHealth, the state’s Medicaid program continued to receive creditable coverage; 
individuals who earned up to 300% of the poverty line but who did not qualify for MassHealth received heavily 
state-subsidized health insurance. The mandate also required individuals to purchase insurance if it is “affordable;” 
those who could not afford health insurance were not penalized by the fine that ranges from $0 to approximately 
$1200 per year. 26 The newly insured tend to buy health insurance with the lowest monthly premium – specifically plans featuring 
the highest possible deductible and copay rates allowed by law (Marzilli Ericson and Starc, 2012). 
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patients who have a high propensity to need medical services.  Each patient has a demand for 
health care: 
1)  𝑞𝑖 = 𝑞𝑖(𝑃, 𝑥,ℎ), 𝑖 ∈ (ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑦, 𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑘),  
where 𝑞𝑖 is the quantity of health care demanded by patient type i at a price level P given patient 
demographics x, and the type of insurance, h, that the patient has (if any). 
 𝑁ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑦 is the number of healthy patients in the market and 𝑁𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑘 is the number of sick 
patients.  The market demand, 𝑄𝑖, for a particular patient type is the summation of all of the 
demands of individuals of that patient type and can be expressed as: 
 2) 𝑄𝑖 = ∑ 𝑞𝑖𝑁𝑖 . 
 Total market demand can be expressed as: 
 3) 𝑄 =  𝑄ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑦 + 𝑄𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑘.  
We assume that sick patients are more likely to purchase health insurance than healthy patients, 
and when purchasing health insurance, enroll in more generous plans when the price of health 
insurance is the same for both types of patients.  We also assume that health insurance makes 
demand less price elastic; this assumption is in line with the findings of the Rand Health 
Insurance Study (Manning et al., 1988).  The market demand functions for healthy patients 
(𝑄ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑦), sick patients (𝑄𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑘), and the entire market (𝑄) are shown in Figures 1, 2, and 3, 
respectively. 𝑄𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑘 is more inelastic than 𝑄ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑦 because a larger proportion of sick patients are 
insured, pre-reform. 
 The marginal cost, 𝑀𝐶, of producing a unit of health care is 
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 4) 𝑀𝐶 = 𝑀𝐶(𝑄ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑦,𝑄𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑘,𝑔) 
where 𝑔 is the available technology for producing health care.  We assume that on the margin, 
production of a unit of health care is more expensive if the unit is produced for a sick patient 
than if the health care is produced for a healthy patient. However, health care providers cannot 
price discriminate and charge sick patients a higher price than healthy patients. 
 We now consider a health insurance mandate where all patients are now required to hold 
a health insurance policy of at least a minimum level of coverage.  We assume that all the 
previously uninsured patients purchase a plan with the minimum acceptable level of coverage; 
this assumption follows the findings of Ericson and Stark (2012).  We also assume that all 
patients that held insurance before the insurance mandate held an insurance policy that is 
acceptable under the mandate and choose not to change plans. 
 The mandate will have two major effects on the market.  The first is that aggregate health 
care demand will become more inelastic as more patients purchase insurance.  The decrease in 
the magnitude of the elasticity (increase in steepness of the demand curve), will be of greater 
magnitude for healthy individuals because less of them held insurance before the mandate was 
enacted.  The change in the elasticity of demand will happen very quickly, as soon as individuals 
have insurance the demand curve will change.  The second effect is that healthy patients (who 
had the larger increase in insurance enrollment) will now demand more health care relative to 
sick patients than they did before the reform.  The increase in healthier patient demand will 
lower the marginal cost function for health services as it is less expensive on the margin to treat a 
healthy patient.  The effect of healthier patients in the patient pool on expected costs will be 
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slower, as physicians will need to experience treating healthier patients before the expect to see 
more of them in the future.  Both of these effects are shown in Figure 1.27 
Data 
Price Data 
Our analysis uses physician reimbursement data from the Medical/Surgical Module of the 
FAIR Health Database between 2005 and 2009.  FAIR Health collects claims data from private 
health insurance companies and uses them to produce tables for calculating out of network 
reimbursement.  The complete Medical/Surgical module accounts for roughly 28 percent of the 
total number of private insurer claims in the United States in a given year.28  Within a claim, 
individual procedure types can be identified by line item via the American Medical Association’s 
Current Procedure Terminology codes.  Each claim’s date is known and is designated with the 
three digit zip code in which the service was provided.   
For each line item we are able to observe how much the provider charges to the insurance 
company and how much the insurance company reimburses the provider.  The amount charged 
to the insurance company is an amount that is influenced by a number of factors that change 
when the mandate comes into play.  For example, it is the fee that would be charged to uninsured 
individuals – who become a rarity after the reform.  This introduces variation other than the 
effect of the reform through the channels discussed above into the amount providers charge 
insurance companies, and as such we focus on the amount that the insurance company 
27 The above analysis ignores the presence of deductibles or copays in the insurance policies, which are present in 
the Massachusetts health care reform.  This omission is for simplicity’s sake, deductibles and copays can be 
included with the same result as long as the size of deductibles and copays are small compared to the overall cost of 
the procedures used.  28 Kleiner, et. al (2012) discuss the representativeness of the data to the entirety of insurance claims in the United 
States in 2008. They find that the distribution of prices for well-baby (including well-infant) services in the Fair 
Health data and a nationally representative dataset (MarketScan) are extremely similar, leading them to infer that the 
price analysis would be representative of all well-infant health insurance claims in the United States. 
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reimburses the provider, henceforth the allowed amount.  The allowed amount is the final price 
paid for all medical services observed in the data. 
We focus on three groups of line items as identified by their CPT codes.  The first group is 
comprised of appendectomies, and includes CPT codes for appendectomies, laparoscopic 
appendectomies and appendectomies performed on an already burst appendix.  The demand for 
appendectomies is extremely price inelastic, as failure to undergo surgery when an 
appendectomy is recommended by a physician can lead to death.  We do not expect the demand 
for appendectomies to change as a result of the health reform.  
The second group of line items examined is for well-infant visits.  This group includes CPT 
codes for visits for patients under one year old (one code for new patients and one code for 
returning patients).  Well-infant visits are likely an elastic set of procedures pre-reform, as 
uninsured children receive fewer than half of the recommended six well-infant visits in their first 
year of life.  Of the procedure groups that we examine, demand for well-infant visits is the most 
price elastic pre-reform.  An increase in the number of insured should greatly decrease the 
magnitude of the price elasticity of demand for well-infant visits. 
The final group of line items is for well-adult visits and includes codes for 18 to 44 year old 
visits (one code for new patients and one code for returning patients) and for 44 to 65 year old 
visits (one code for new patients and one code for returning patients).  Price elasticity of demand 
for well-adult visits is likely somewhere between that of appendectomies, which are very 
inelastic, and well-infant visits, which are relatively elastic.  Table 1 presents summary statistics 
for the allowed amounts used in the analysis. Mean allowed prices for well-adult visits are 
approximately 110 dollars, and mean well-infant visits are approximately 85 dollars. Mean 
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appendectomy allowed prices are much higher at 1000 dollars. An appendectomy is an inpatient 
visit: the charge for the individual appendectomy CPT code is a large fraction of the total price 
of the procedure (we do not observe anesthesia and other hospital allowed amounts), thus the 
magnitude of the mean allowed amount of appendectomies can be misleadingly small.29  
Demographic  Information 
Demographic information was collected from a commercial database purchased from Zip-
codes.com and the publicly available American Community Survey.  Zip-codes.com 
consolidates demographic, economic, and geographic information about each postal zip-code in 
the United States using raw data from existing sources including the United States Postal Service 
and the United States Census Bureau.   Table 2 includes a list of the covariates in the analysis 
along with their means and standard deviations.  Specifically, we control for measures of 
population density (population, housing units per zip code and persons per housing unit) and 
measures of the price level (median household income and average price of a home) to control 
for population differences that could influence the price of health care. Zip-codes.com data is 
aggregated to the state level to avoid dummy oversaturation in the regression equation.  
The American Community Survey (ACS) provides individual level demographic data that we 
population weight and aggregate to the state-by-year level. The variables include age, marital 
status, number of children per household, the percent of the population that is Black, the percent 
of the population with Hispanic origin, employment status, family income, sex, and educational 
attainment. 
29 Appendix 2 includes a brief discussion of allowed price trends in Massachusetts.  
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Methods 
A difference-in-differences estimation strategy is used to identify the effect of the 
Massachusetts health insurance reform on reimbursement. The outcome of interest is the allowed 
amount for a specific health service type: well-adult visits, well-infant visits, or appendectomies.  
Each service corresponds to a group of CPT codes.  A particular CPT code indicates the specifics 
of the service that took place (for example, a separate CPT code is used if the appendectomy was 
performed after the appendix burst). To allow for differences in the conditions under which a 
procedure occurred, we estimate all models with CPT-specific fixed effects.  
The allowed amounts for procedures performed in other northeastern states are used as a 
control group. These states include Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire, Connecticut, Rhode 
Island, New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Maryland, Delaware, and Washington D.C. 
Washington D.C. is omitted from the appendectomy analysis due to the small number performed 
in the D.C. area.   
Models of the following specification are estimated using ordinary least squares:  
5) 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑀𝐴𝑠 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑡 +  𝛽3 ∗ 𝑀𝐴𝑠  × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑡 + 𝛽4 ∗
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 +  𝛽5 ∗ 𝑀𝐴𝑠  × 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 + Xst′ β + 𝜔𝑠 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜓𝑝 + 𝜖𝑝𝑠𝑡. 
The subscript p denotes CPT codes, s denotes states and t denotes years.  𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑠𝑡 is the allowed 
amount for the procedure grouping in question.  𝑀𝐴𝑠 is a dummy variable which takes on the 
value of 1 if the procedure was performed in Massachusetts and takes on a value of 0 if the 
procedure was performed in a different northeastern state.  𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑡 is a dummy variable 
that takes on the value 1 for the years after the reform (2008 and 2009) and takes on the value 0 
for years prior to the reform (2005 and 2006), A separate dummy for 2007, 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 , 
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is used to capture the effect of the reform immediately after implementation, before all actors in 
the market have time to adjust.  This dummy is also interacted with the post period.  The 
differences-in-differences estimators, 𝛽3 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛽5, are the coefficients on the interaction between 
the two post period indicators and the dummy for Massachusetts.  𝛽5 provides the estimated 
effect of the health care reform on the allowed price of the procedures before the market has time 
to totally adjust and 𝛽3 provides the estimated effect of the health care reform on the allowed 
price of the procedures after the market has time to totally adjust.  Xst′  is a matrix of control 
variables from the Zipcode.com data.  Additionally, 𝜔𝑠 is a set of state fixed effects, 𝜆𝑡 is a set of 
year fixed effects, 𝜓𝑝is a set of CPT code fixed effects, and 𝜖𝑝𝑠𝑡is a set of robust standard errors 
clustered at the state-CPT-year level.  Additional specifications include state by CPT, year by 
CPT fixed effects and state specific time trends. 
The difference-in-differences approach compares changes in the price of procedures in 
Massachusetts to changes in the price of procedures in similar states that did not pass a reform.  
The first difference across time removes any time-invariant state level characteristics that could 
influence prices.  The second difference across states removes an approximation of the baseline 
effect that would have occurred had Massachusetts not passed the reform.30   
Results 
Appendectomy 
 Estimates show that the Massachusetts Health Insurance reform did not differentially 
affect the prices of appendectomies in post-reform Massachusetts. There was no effect in the 
implementation period as well as no effect once the implementation period was over.  Table 3A 
reports regression results: the first row reports the difference-in-differences estimate for the post-
30 This approximation is valid to the extent that the control states are similar to Massachusetts. 
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implementation period.  The fourth row reports the estimate for during the implementation 
period.  Each column shows a regression with a different set of controls and fixed effects which 
are noted in the bottom portion of the table.  All coefficient estimates other than the difference-
in-differences estimate are suppressed.31   The largest effect found on reimbursements for 
appendectomy price is approximately 3 percent, however, none of the estimates are statistically 
significant at conventional levels, and in many cases the estimate has a lower magnitude than its 
standard error, which makes a strong case for the average effect of the estimates being 
effectively zero given the number of observations. These results are in line with the demand for 
appendectomies not changing substantially as a result of the reform. 
Well-Infant Visits  The results for well-infant visit reimbursements are reported in Table 3B. The layout of 
Table 3B is identical to that of Table 3A, the only difference being the dependent variable in the 
regressions.  Reimbursement for well-infant visits did exhibit a statistically significant increase 
during the implementation period; all of the estimates were very close to a 4 percent increase in 
reimbursement. This result is robust to the inclusion of several different groups of fixed effects, 
and hardly changes at all once demographic controls are added.  The increase in reimbursement 
is consistent with an increase in the number of parents taking their children for well-infant visits, 
during the implementation period.  Once the implementation period is over, we find a very small 
negative effect (8 tenths of a percent) of the reform on reimbursement once all controls and fixed 
effects are included. 
Well-Adult Visits 
 The regression results for well-adult visits are reported in Table 3C, which shares the 
same layout as Tables 3A and B.   We find no effect of the reform on reimbursement at 
31 Full regression results which include covariates as control variables are available upon request.                                                              
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conventional levels during the implementation period, and also no effect of the reform at 
conventional levels after the implementation period once all controls and fixed effects are 
included in the estimation. 
Threats to Identification  
The above estimates may be biased by omitted variables that are correlated with 
reimbursement for health services and that occur at the same time as the Massachusetts health 
reform went into effect.  Many of the likely candidates for such variables are controlled for 
directly.  For example, we include state populations, education levels and incomes, which do not 
change dramatically from 2003 through 2007, but show enough variation to warrant inclusion in 
the regressions (Table 2).  However, the Massachusetts reform had effects other than increasing 
the number of insured which makes identifying the effect on reimbursement of changes in 
demand elasticity difficult to identify. 
The pool of providers  may have increased as a result of the reform.  In 2008, the state and 
private insurers established a loan forgiveness program for medical professionals who committed 
to working in underserved areas for a minimum of two years (MassResources.org).  The 
physician population is an example of an omitted variable that would have likely changed around 
the same time as the reform and that would be correlated with the price of care. 
There are other such variables.  Despite efforts to draw more health care professionals to 
Massachusetts, the Massachusetts Medical Society (2011) reported that patients were facing 
longer wait times and that more than half of primary care physicians were not taking new 
patients as an unintended consequence of the reform. The Physicians Workforce Study in 
Massachusetts (MMS, 2011) found that physicians who practiced family and internal medicine 
were in severely short supply for a sixth consecutive year in 2011.  Clearly, wait times would 
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have changed with the reform and this could have also influenced willingness to pay and thus the 
price of services.  The same could be true for quality of care.32 
 To illustrate this point we conduct a simple analysis of the impact of the reform on the 
supply of physicians. We estimate an equation similar to those used for the reimbursement 
analysis on the state supply of physicians and pediatricians:  
6)  ln(𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑃ℎ𝑦𝑠𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑡) = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑀𝐴 + Σ𝑡=20032008 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑀𝐴 × 𝜆𝑡 + Xst′ β + 𝜔𝑠 +
𝜆𝑡 + 𝜖𝑠𝑡. 
The left hand side variable ln(𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑃ℎ𝑦𝑠𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑡) is the natural log of the number of 
physicians in a given state in a given year.  We estimate equation 6 for all physicians and for just 
pediatricians.  The above estimating equation does not specifically capture the effect of the 
Massachusetts health reform. We instead report Massachusetts by year interaction effects, which 
show percent changes in the number of doctors choosing to practice in Massachusetts over time.  
Table 4 reports the Massachusetts state by year interaction effects, where the year 2005 is 
the omitted year.  The state and year fixed effects soak up much of the variation in the supply of 
physicians: it is possible that the reported effects are due to near multi-collinearity of the 
regressors or small sample sizes. Nevertheless, these results are suggestive that the changing 
supply of physicians played a role in the previously reported effects on reimbursement of the 
Massachusetts reform.  An increase in family practice physicians and pediatricians after 2006 
may have counteracted upward pressure on reimbursement that the newly insured exerted. The 
increase in physician supply changes the interpretation of the effect of health reform on 
reimbursements. The reform affected both aggregate demand for health services and aggregate 
32 Miller (2012) finds that the ill are more likely to receive care from a physician’s office rather than from an 
emergency room after the reform – clearly an increase in quality for those seeking care.                                                              
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supply of health service providers.  The previous estimates capture the shifts in both supply and 
demand instead of the previously thought shift in demand for health services. 
 Refinement – Triple Differences 
 The results from the difference in differences estimation that we attribute to an increase 
in the demand for health services may be biased by unobserved factors. Bias in the estimates 
may occur because the demand for insurance coverage of health services increases instead of an 
increase in the demand for health services. 
We further refine our estimates by using a differences-in-differences-in-differences or 
triple difference estimation strategy.  The triple difference takes the difference between the 
difference-in-differences estimate for well-infant or well-adult exams and the difference-in-
differences estimate for appendectomies.  Because demand for appendectomies is extremely 
inelastic (Manning et al., 1987) and we do not expect it to change as a result of the health reform, 
the third difference removes any effects of the reform that may influence reimbursement that are 
not tied to changes in demand for services.  As long as the effect of new physicians, quality of 
care, and demand for insurance coverage is the same for well visits as it is for appendectomies, 
the triple differences strategy will accurately report the effect of changes in demand on price. 
 The triple difference estimates for well-infant visits are presented in Table 5A.  Table 5A 
follows the same format as tables 3A, B and C.  The reported estimates are now from the triple 
differences estimating equation.  Once again, the estimated show an increase in reimbursement 
during the implementation period and no effect of the reform once the implementation period is 
over.  The estimate of the effect of the implementation period on reimbursement of 
approximately 2 percent is smaller in magnitude than the difference in differences estimate of 
approximately 4 percent. 
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 The triple differences estimates for well-adult visits are presented in Table 5B.  Table 5B 
has the same format as Table 5A.  Once all controls and fixed effects are included in the 
estimating equation, we find no effect of the reform in either the implementation period or post 
period on reimbursement at conventional levels. 
Conclusion  
The Massachusetts health care reform greatly increased the number of people in 
Massachusetts covered by health insurance.  The above analysis shows that the increase in 
insurance coverage was accompanied by sizable increases in reimbursement for procedures that 
gained a larger patient base with the introduction of the insurance mandate.  These increases in 
reimbursement were temporary: the increases were eventually offset by decreases in the cost of 
provision as healthier individuals entered the market. 
Our results have broader implications for the remainder of the United States, as additional 
portions of the Affordable Care Act come into effect.  A nationwide individual mandate would 
likely have similar effects to the mandate seen in Massachusetts.  Specifically, the price of many 
procedures with relatively elastic demand before the Affordable Care Act should be expected to 
rise during the period while the individual mandate provisions are coming into effect. 
We can get a rough estimate of how large such an impact may be using the Medical 
Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) data.  In 2009, the average amount paid by public insurance 
to physicians per person for an office visit in the United States was 69 dollars.  We can 
approximately calculate the additional amount of money paid to physicians if the average change 
in price of an office procedure is 2 percent, all else equal.  
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If we consider the non-Massachusetts, non-Medicare or Medicaid U.S. infant population, 
roughly 19 million individuals, and assume an average of 3 well care visits per infant during the 
implementation year, a similar health insurance mandate would create around 200 million dollars 
in additional office visit costs through increased reimbursement.  This does not consider other 
elastic procedures that may also see increases in prices.  Even as a rough estimate, the magnitude 
of this one year price increase underscores the importance of having a firm grasp of the price 
effects when considering health insurance mandates such as the Affordable Care Act. 
 As a final note, it is also important to remember that the full effects of the Massachusetts 
reforms are still being measured.  Our study, along with others in the literature provides 
estimates that are informative as to the short run effects of the reform.  It is unclear how the 
reform will affect health care prices, access to care, and health service quality in the long run as 
slow-moving market factors such as the supply of new doctors and hospitals adjust to the 
program changes. 
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Figure 3.1: Market Demand for Health Care
    
103  
Table 3.1: CPT codes  
Procedure CPT Description 
Allowed Price 
Mean Std. Dev.       
Well-Adult Exam 
99385 Age 18-44 New Patient 123.73 38.27 
99386 Age 45-64 New Patient 142.13 41.53 
99395 Age 18-44 Established Patient 102.13 30.23 
99396 Age 45-64 Established Patient 113.91 32.93 
      
Well - Infant Exam 99381 Age <1 year New Patient 98.00 31.70 
 99391 Age <1 year Established Patient 76.87 25.08 
      
Appendectomy 44950 Laparoscopic 861.00 1,125.78 
 44960 Open 1,096.47 1,577.23 
 44970 Open with Perforated Appendicitis 1,104.73 2,157.35           
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Table 3.2: Demographic Summary Statistics  
   
Variable All States
Northeastern 
States Massachusetts
White 0.80 0.82 0.84
(0.13) (0.11) (0.01)
Black 0.10 0.10 0.06
(0.11) (0.08) (0.00)
Female 0.51 0.52 0.52
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Percent Employed 0.63 0.64 0.64
(0.04) (0.03) (0.01)
Percent Married 0.54 0.53 0.50
(0.05) (0.03) (0.02)
Hispanic Origin 0.08 0.07 0.07
(0.09) (0.05) (0.00)
Percent with High School Degree 0.40 0.39 0.35
(0.04) (0.03) (0.01)
Percent with Some College 0.23 0.21 0.20
(0.03) (0.02) (0.01)
Percent with College Degree 0.25 0.29 0.35
(0.05) (0.04) (0.01)
Age 46.15 46.92 46.54
(1.22) (0.69) (0.13)
ln(Population) 7.94 8.28 8.83
(0.83) (0.65) (0.02)
ln(House Value) 11.38 11.74 12.11
(0.42) (0.28) (0.17)
People per Household 2.2 2.5 2.5
(0.79) (0.51) (0.60)
Number of Children per Household 0.66 0.65 0.65
(0.08) (0.05) (0.03)
Houses per zipcode 3217 3846 4668
(2302) (1721) (841)
Income 33247 44630 49568
(12691) (9616) (8742)
N 255 55 5
Notes: State demographic data was calculated using the publicly available American Community 
Survey and the proprietary zip-code.com database. Numbers are weighted by state population. 
105   
Table 3.3A: Reform Effects on Appendectomy Prices  
Appendectomies: ln(Allowed Price) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
MA x Post Health Reform 0.034 0.036 0.035 0.036 
Std. Error 0.045 0.08 0.045 0.043 
t-statistic 0.75 0.21 0.78 0.84 
     
MA x Implementation Period -0.01 0.057 0.075 0.069 
Std. Error 0.026 0.27 0.154 0.149 
t-statistic 0.38 0.21 0.49 0.47 
     
Demographics No Yes Yes Yes 
Procedure FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Specific Tends Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Procedure x State FE No No Yes Yes 
Procedure x Year FE No No No Yes 
     
Observation 49592 48130 48130 48130 
R-Squared 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Standard errors are clustered by state-year-procedure.  Demographics come from Zipcode.com and the ACS.  ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance and the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.   
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Table 3.3B: Reform Effects on Well-Infant Visit Prices  
Well Infant Visits: ln(Allowed Price) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
MA x Post Health Reform -0.006 -0.008 -0.007 -0.008* 
Std. Error 0.02 0.012 0.007 0.006 
t-statistic 0.31 0.65 1.08 1.34 
     
MA x Implementation Period 0.044*** 0.040*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 
Std. Error 0.009 0.006 0.006 0.003 
t-statistic 4.71 7.18 11.72 11.88 
     
Demographics No Yes Yes Yes 
Procedure FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Specific Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Procedure x State FE No No Yes Yes 
Procedure x Year FE No No No Yes 
     
Observation 2,476,171 1,702,783 1,702,783 1,702,783 
R-Squared 0.34 0.36 0.36 0.36 
Standard errors are clustered by state-year-procedure.  Demographics come from Zipcode.com and the ACS.  ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance and the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.    
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Table 3.3C: Reform Effects on Well-Adult Visit Prices  
Well Adult Visits: ln(Allowed Price) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
MA x Post Health Reform -0.002 0.007 0.007 0.006 
Std. Error 0.017 0.012 0.011 0.011 
t-statistic 0.09 0.57 0.62 0.62 
     
MA x Implementation Period 0.037*** -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 
Std. Error 0.014 0.012 0.009 0.009 
t-statistic 3.61 0.75 0.98 0.98 
     
Demographics No Yes Yes Yes 
Procedure FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Specific Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Procedure x State FE No No Yes Yes 
Procedure x Year FE No No No Yes 
     
Observation 11,303,645 8,469,844 8,469,844 8,469,844 
R-Squared 0.32 0.31 0.31 0.32 
Standard errors are clustered by state-year-procedure.  Demographics come from Zipcode.com and the ACS.  ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance and the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.   
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Table 3.4: Physician Supply in Massachusetts, Yearly and DD Estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ln(number of physicians) All Fields All Fields Pediatricians Pediatricians 
     
MA x 2006 -0.074  0.182  
 (0.272)  (0.225)  
MA x 2007 0.032  0.388*  
 (0.273)  (0.233)  
MA x 2008 0.021  0.497**  
 (0.270)  (0.251)  
MA x 2009 0.052  0.437**  
 (0.273)  (0.211)  
MA x Post Health Reform  0.0726  0.349** 
  (0.177)  (0.142) 
     
Demographics No Yes Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observation 11,872 11,872 474 474 
R-Squared 0.30 0.30 0.55 0.55 
Standard errors are clustered by state-year-procedure.  Demographics come from Zipcode.com and the ACS.  ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance and the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.  Robust standard errors in parentheses.    
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Table 3.5A: Reform Effects on Well-Infant Visit Prices (Triple Difference) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
MA x Post Health Reform x Well-Infant -0.003* 0.01 0.005 0.005 
Std. Error 0.019 0.016 0.007 0.007 
t-statistic 0.14 0.63 0.78 0.78 
     
MA x Implementation Period 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 
Std. Error 0.037 0.032 0.013 0.013 
t-statistic 0.42 0.49 1.72 1.71 
     
Demographics No Yes Yes Yes 
Procedure FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Specific Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Procedure x State FE No No Yes Yes 
Procedure x Year FE No No No Yes 
     
Observation 2,524,301 1,750,913 1,750,913 1,750,913 
R-Squared 0.60 0.65 0.65 0.65 
Standard errors are clustered by state-year-procedure.  Demographics come from Zipcode.com and the ACS.  ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance and the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. 
We include Post-Reform, Well-Infant, and MA interaction terms in the regressions.  
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Table 3.5B: Reform Effects on Well-Adult Visit Prices (Triple Difference) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
MA x Post Health Reform x Well-Adult 0.005 0.037 0.035 0.035 
Std. Error 0.058 0.076 0.076 0.076 
t-statistic 0.08 0.49 0.46 0.46 
     
MA x Implementation Period 0.052 0.054** 0.044 0.044 
Std. Error 0.042 0.041 0.038 0.038 
t-statistic 1.25 1.34 1.14 1.14 
     
Demographics No Yes Yes Yes 
Procedure FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Specific Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Procedure x State FE No No Yes Yes 
Procedure x Year FE No No No Yes 
     
Observation 11,280,363 8,466,662 8,466,662 8,466,662 
R-Squared 0.38 0.40 0.40 0.40 
Standard errors are clustered by state-year-procedure.  Demographics come from Zipcode.com and the ACS.  ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance and the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.  
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Appendix 3.1: Minimum Credible Coverage Requirements 
In order to qualify as a credible insurance plan, insurance in Massachusetts must cover at least the 
following:33 
• Ambulatory patient services, including outpatient day surgery and related anesthesia 
• Diagnostic imaging procedures, including x-rays 
• Emergency services 
• Hospitalization, including at a minimum, inpatient acute care services which are generally 
provided by an acute care hospital for covered benefits in accordance with the member’s 
subscriber certificate plan description 
• Maternity and newborn care 
• Medical/surgical care, including preventative and primary care 
• Mental health and substance abuse services 
• Prescription drugs 
• Radiation therapy and chemotherapy 
 
Appendix 3.2: Prices in Massachusetts and Northeastern States   
The assumption that prices for health services always change at a non-negative rate allows us to place an 
upper bound on our estimates of the effect of the Massachusetts Health Insurance Reform. This 
assumption takes the mathematical form and allows us to set the second term to zero:  
𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 = �𝑃𝑀𝐴,𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚 − 𝑃𝑀𝐴,𝑝𝑟𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚� − �𝑃𝑁𝐸,𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚 − 𝑃𝑁𝐸,𝑝𝑟𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚� 
Empirically, isolating the Massachusetts data and taking a simple first difference of the price data to 
determine a plausible upper bound for the change in prices, without controlling for demographics. The 
change in demographics are so slight that they cause near-multicollinearity in regression results and 
render the post-reform estimates unusable. 
 
The following graphs provide additional justification for the triple-differences estimation strategy: despite 
the fact that the demand for appendectomies should remain unchanged, the price of appendectomies 
increases. This indicates that while demand for the appendectomies remains the same, the demand for 
insurance that covers appendectomies increases.  
33 Requirements takes from the Massachusetts Health Connector website, mahealthconnector.org 
Appendectomy: Well-Infant: Well-Adult:
ln(allowed) ln(allowed) ln(allowed) 
Procedural First Differences in Massachusetts
Post-Reform 0.066 0.065 0.036
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Figure 3.2: Price Trends in Health Services 
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